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“Statistical Judo”:  The Rhetoric of Senate Inaction in 
the Judicial Appointment Process 
E. Stewart Moritz
*
 
 
“I don't want to take this time to engage in statistical judo  
on judicial nominees.”1 
-Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) 
 
“We can prove anything with statistics.  They can prove anything with 
statistics; we can prove anything with statistics.”2 
-Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) 
 
“Republicans and Democrats can‟t give you the facts.”3 
-Uncle Tupelo 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Until relatively recently, most legal scholarship on the judicial 
confirmation process, and indeed most public interest in the subject, has 
centered on highly public partisan fights over Supreme Court 
nominations.
4
  There has been plenty to consider on that score, back to the 
earliest days of the Republic.  Famously, George Washington‟s 1795 
nomination of John Rutledge to replace John Jay as Chief Justice was 
scuttled by partisan politics, despite Rutledge‟s confirmation for an initial 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, University of Akron School of Law.  B.A., Yale; J.D., Vanderbilt.  I thank 
Sarah Cravens, Brant Lee, Molly O‟Brien, Elizabeth Reilly, and Tracy Thomas for insightful comments 
that improved the text and for encouragement that inspired it to be finished.  Sincere thanks also to 
Stephen Burbank, Michael Gerhardt, and Elliot Slotnick for comments on a draft of this piece.  Finally, 
thanks to Maura O‟Shea for pretty much everything. 
1 148 CONG. REC. S121 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Hatch).  See also 147 CONG. 
REC. S13116 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“As everyone here knows, I do not 
like to engage in the typical statistics judo that seems to be intrinsic to this issue.”). 
2 147 CONG. REC. S10673 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 2001) (statement of Sen. Reid). 
3 UNCLE TUPELO, We‘ve Been Had, on ANODYNE (Sire Records 1993).  See also Noelle Straub, 
Judicial Gridlock in Senate:  Same Story, Different Setting, THE HILL, Feb. 27, 2002, at 1 (“With rising 
concern over the vacancy rate, both Leahy and Hatch, now the ranking members, cite different statistics 
to bolster their argument that they treated judicial nominees fairly.”).   
4 See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES:  LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM 
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 1 (Yale 1997) (“The selection of a Supreme Court justice is front-page 
news . . . .  But throughout American history we find little such national attention given to the selection 
of lower federal court judges.”); cf. id. at 308-09 (citing mid-1980‟s nominations of Jefferson B. 
Sessions III to a district judgeship and Daniel A. Manion to the Seventh Circuit as “the first instance of 
a major national media campaign to defeat lower-court nominations”). 
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seat as Associate Justice on the Supreme Court four years earlier.
5
  During 
the 1800s, fights over Supreme Court nominees were common, and 
twenty-five of 108 Court nominees were not confirmed.
6
  In 1969 and 
1970, two successive nominees to the Court by President Nixon, Clement 
Haynsworth, Jr. and G. Harrold Carswell, were rejected after highly 
publicized hearings.
7
  More recently, President Reagan‟s nomination of 
Robert Bork and President George H.W. Bush‟s (“Bush I‟s”) nomination 
of Justice Clarence Thomas have garnered enormous scholarly and public 
interest.
8
  In perhaps the starkest example yet of partisan attention paid to 
Supreme Court nominations, interest groups spent nearly $2.5 million 
dollars on television advertising in the latest “campaign” for the 
confirmation of Samuel Alito to the Court.
9
 
However, the confirmation process for the lower courts, and especially 
the issue of Senate delay in confirming lower-court judges, was not 
discussed much in the academy or the mainstream media until relatively 
recently.
10
  Significant interest in confirmation delay only arose in the last 
two years of the Bush I presidency, in 1991 and 1992, when Democrats 
had control of the Senate, and again in the period following the 1994 
elections, when Republicans took back the Senate and moved to block 
                                                 
5 See Calvin R. Massey, Getting There:  A Brief History of the Politics of Supreme Court 
Appointments, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 5 (1991); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Senate, The Constitution, and The Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1500-01 (1992) 
(discussing the rejection of Rutledge and other Supreme Court nominees due to political 
considerations).  See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 
(2000); Paul A. Freund, Appointment Of Justices:  Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1146 (1988) (examining the historical role of politics in the Supreme Court confirmation process). 
6 Freund, supra note 5, at 1147. 
7 Id. at 1155-56. 
8 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164 (1988); 
Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice:  A Commentary On The Nomination And Confirmation Of Justice 
Thomas, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 969 (1992); Calvin R. Massey, supra note 5; Glenn Harlan Reynolds, 
Taking Advice Seriously:  An Immodest Proposal For Reforming The Confirmation Process, 65 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1577 (1992). 
9 Press Release, Brennan Center for Justice, TV Advertising Data Reveals Group Adopting 
Different Strategies in Alito Confirmation Battle (Jan. 26, 2006), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/press_detail.asp?key=100&subkey=34246. 
10 See Stephen B. Burbank, Politics, Privilege & Power:  The Senate‘s Role in the Appointment of 
Federal Judges, 86 JUDICATURE 24, 25 (2002) (“[W]hen the Senate considers a nomination to the 
Supreme Court, it is engaged in an act of obvious national importance, attracting substantial public 
interest, and its members therefore must be careful at least to seem to act responsibly.  Appointments to 
the lower federal courts have not, for most of our history, engaged remotely similar public interest.”); 
Elliot E. Slotnick, A Historical Perspective on Federal Judicial Selection, 86 JUDICATURE 13, 13 
(2002) (“Federal judicial selection, at least for the lower courts, has been a relatively invisible focal 
point for public interest until recent years.”). 
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certain of President Clinton‟s lower-court judicial nominations.11  Even 
then, confirmation delays in the Bush I era were seen at the time as at least 
as much of an executive branch as a Senate problem.
12
  And “common 
knowledge” traced the Republican actions during the Clinton period to the 
failed Bork nomination and the difficult Clarence Thomas confirmation.
13
  
In other words, Republican “inaction” was often seen as retribution for 
previous actions, rather than as a separate political strategy of the Senate.
14
 
Still, deliberate Senate delay was a growing background issue among 
scholars beginning in the early 1990s, and eventually the issue of inaction 
                                                 
11 Pre-1994 commentary specifically addressing the issue of delay seems naïve in today‟s 
atmosphere of scorched-earth partisan politics:  
 
Moreover, while the executive branch has as much time as it needs to study a 
person before appointing her, the Senate has little time to act:  once the President 
has nominated someone to fill a vacancy, the Senate cannot delay its decision for 
long without appearing irresponsible.  Even if the Senate did mobilize its 
resources, study the nominee, and decide to reject her, it would have to repeat the 
process all over again with another nominee who was known to the 
Administration but not to the Senators.  In theory, the Senate could establish a 
duplicate bureaucracy and investigate each nominee to the lower courts as 
thoroughly as it wished.  But the expense, and the political costs of the delay, 
would be prohibitive. 
 
Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1508.   
12 An interesting 1989 article by Professor Daniel J. Meador examined delay in the confirmation of 
federal judges, but focused more on delays in the executive branch nomination process:  “Although 
[from 1979 to 1988 there were] some egregious delays by the Senate, the major delays lie at the pre-
nomination stage and have to be laid at the door of the executive authorities.”  Daniel J. Meador, 
Unacceptable Delays in Judicial Appointments, 6 J.L. & POL. 7-9 (1989).  See also Kim Dayton, 
Judicial Vacancies and Delay in the Federal Courts: An Empirical Evaluation, 67 ST. JOHN‟S L. REV. 
757, 766 n.48 (1993) (“The [Administrative Office of the U.S. Court]‟s statistics suggest that, at least 
in the past decade, most of the time lapse between the occurrence of a vacancy and the confirmation of 
a new district judge is attributable to the executive branch although the congressional share has 
increased in the last couple of years.”); Editorial, Delay in Filling Federal Judicial Vacancies, 74 
JUDICATURE 64, 64 (1990) (overlooking intentional delays by the Senate, and instead concluding that 
“it appears that selection priorities of and criteria used within the DOJ, the Senate and the White House 
contribute most to prolonging the process”). 
13 See Brannon P. Denning, Reforming the New Confirmation Process:  Replacing ―Despise and 
Resent‖ With ―Advice and Consent,” 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 11 (2001).  See also GERHARDT, supra note 
5, at 77, 355 n.83 (collecting sources); Peter Grier, Why Senate Roughs Up Some Cabinet Nominees, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 19, 1997, at 3 (“Republicans date the coarsening of the confirmation 
process to Reagan-era nominee Robert Bork, whose chance to sit on the Supreme Court was defeated 
by a Democratic-controlled Senate in 1987.”); Walter Shapiro, Happy Days Are Here Again, But Not 
For Liberal Judges, USA TODAY, May 16, 1997, at 2A (“Gone are the traditions of bipartisan comity 
in a GOP Senate that still seems bent on exacting vengeance for the rejection of Robert Bork's 
nomination to the Supreme Court a decade ago.”). 
14 Helen Dewar, Polarized Politics, Confirmation Chaos; Retribution Appears Evident in 
Nominations Since the Late 1980s, WASH. POST, May 11, 2003, at A5 (“Republicans believed 
Democrats had mistreated Supreme Court nominees Robert H. Bork, who was rejected by the Senate in 
1987, and Clarence Thomas, who was narrowly confirmed in 1991, both after bitter fights.  So they 
zeroed in on Clinton‟s nominees.”). 
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in the confirmation process moved to the forefront of public debate.  
Commentary on the subject began to pick up in the mid-1990s, and this has 
led to some thoughtful articles on the constitutional obligations of the 
Senate and Executive.
15
  Delay in the confirmation process was a frequent 
complaint of liberal commentators and senators during the last six years of 
the Clinton presidency.
16
  The issue was quiet during the first months 
following the election of George W. Bush (“Bush II”) in 2000, largely 
because the president enjoyed Republican control of the Senate.
17
  Senator 
James Jeffords‟s switch from Republican to Independent in May 2001, 
however, put Democrats in charge of the upper house.  Complaints of 
                                                 
15 See generally GERHARDT, supra note 5; GOLDMAN, supra note 4; G. Calvin MacKenzie, The 
Presidential Appointment Process:  Historical Development, Contemporary Operations, Current 
Issues, in OBSTACLE COURSE: THE REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE 
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS (1996); G. CALVIN MACKENZIE, STARTING OVER:  THE 
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS IN 1997 (1998); Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, The 
Limits of Senatorial Courtesy, 29 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 1 (2004); Stephen B. Burbank, Politics, Privilege & 
Power The Senate‘s Role in the Appointment of Federal Judges, 86 JUDICATURE 24 (2002); Brannon P. 
Denning, The ―Blue Slip‖:  Enforcing the Norms of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 75 (2001); Brannon P. Denning, The Judicial Confirmation Process and the Blue 
Slip, 85 JUDICATURE 218 (2002); Denning, supra note 13; Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the 
Future of the Federal Appointments Process, 50 DUKE L.J. 1687 (2001); Michael J. Gerhardt, Putting 
Presidential Performance in the Federal Appointments Process in Perspective, 47 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 1359 (1997); Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal 
Appointments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‟Y 467 (1998); Sheldon Goldman, Assessing the 
Senate Judicial Confirmation Process:  The Index of Obstruction and Delay, 86 JUDICATURE 251 
(2003); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton‘s First Term Judiciary:  Many Bridges to Cross, 
80 JUDICATURE 254 (1997); Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerard Gryski & Gary Zuk, Clinton‘s 
Judges:  Summing Up the Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE 228 (2001); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, 
Clinton‘s Second Term Judiciary:  Picking Judges Under Fire, 82 JUDICATURE 265 (1999); Sheldon 
Goldman, Unpicking Pickering in 2002:  Some Thoughts on the Politics of Lower Federal Court 
Selection and Confirmation, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 695 (2003) [hereinafter Goldman, Unpicking]; 
William G. Ross, The Questioning of Lower Federal Court Nominees During the Senate Confirmation 
Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 119 (2001); Elliot E. Slotnick, Federal Judicial Selection in the 
New Millenium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 587 (2003); Elliot E. Slotnick, A Historical Perspective on 
Federal Judicial Selection, 86 JUDICATURE 13 (2002); Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an 
Election Year, 49 SMU L. REV. 309 (1996).  Cf. Bob Dylan, The Times They Are a Changin‘, on THE 
TIMES THEY ARE A CHANGIN‟ (Columbia 1964) (“Come Senators, Congressmen, please heed the call.  
Don‟t stand in the doorway, don‟t block up the hall.  For he that gets hurt will be he who has stalled—
there‟s a battle outside and it‟s ragin‟.  It‟ll soon shake your windows and rattle your walls, for the 
times, they are a changin‟.”).  
16 See, e.g., Brian Blomquist, Senate‘s Adjournment Leaves Judgeship Nominees in Limbo:  
Democrats Decry ―Miserable Record,” WASH. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1996, at A3. 
17 The Senate was actually split fifty-fifty, with Republicans chairing committees to reflect the Vice 
President‟s ability to break a tie on any Senate vote.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“The Vice President of the 
United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.”).  
See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.  Moreover, given the timing of judicial nominations and 
confirmation hearings, there is no cause for complaint about Senatorial delay at the start of a new 
presidential administration, as the first nominations are usually not sent to the Senate until July or 
August.  See infra notes 108-110 and accompanying text. 
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delay surfaced nearly immediately, and continued intermittently for the 
next year and a half.
18
 
This article first briefly summarizes the issues that arise in the lower-
court judicial confirmation process, and examines how the issues differ 
from those that arise during the confirmation of Supreme Court justices.  
The article considers constitutionally-based differences as well as practical 
differences in Senate and Executive behavior that have developed during 
more than two centuries of judicial confirmations.   
The body of this article offers a chronological history and critique of the 
rhetoric of both Republican and Democratic senators in discussing lower-
court confirmations during the 107
th
 Congress.  For reasons discussed 
below, this congressional session, spanning the years 2001 to 2002, was a 
particularly interesting one for examining the lower-court nominations 
process.
19
  Much the rhetoric of the 107
th
 Congress relies upon 
comparisons of then-current nomination success rates to earlier judicial 
confirmation rates from the Carter, Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton 
presidencies.  Thus, by carefully analyzing the claims of senators 
concerning judicial appointments during the first Congressional term of 
Bush II‟s presidency, the article is able to survey more than twenty years of  
Senate behavior with respect to lower-court confirmations.  In doing so, 
the article identifies a number of “confirmation process fallacies” that 
senators have repeatedly relied upon in their efforts to score political points 
on confirmation issues.  It also explains some “confirmation process 
relevancies”20 in hopes that future debates can be grounded in important 
considerations rather than trivial and irrelevant ones.  Because the lower-
                                                 
18 See discussion infra note 105 and accompanying text.  Following the mid-term elections of 2002, 
when Republicans narrowly regained control of the Senate, the controversy surrounding lower-court 
appointments reached perhaps its highest level of national prominence.  The Bush II administration 
made a concerted effort to raise the issue, and there was discussion in the Senate and in the mainstream 
press about the propriety of “judicial filibusters” and about constitutional options for changing the 
confirmation process.  See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S7461 (daily ed. July 29, 2002) (statement of Sen. 
Specter) (“I have proposed a protocol which would establish a timetable:  So many days after a 
nominee is submitted by the President there ought to be a Judiciary Committee hearing.  So many days 
later there ought to be action by the Judiciary Committee, voted up or down; and, if voted up, so many 
days later there ought to be floor consideration for confirmation by the entire Senate-with that not being 
an ironclad schedule.”); Brennan Center, supra note 9 (citing $3.3 million in television advertisement 
spending on “Nuclear Option”).  The post-2002 period of controversy is beyond the scope of this 
article. 
19 See discussion infra § III. 
20 See Samuel Langhorne Clemens (“Mark Twain”), N. AM. REV., July 10, 1895 (“Conversations 
consisted mainly of irrelevancies, with here and there a relevancy, a relevancy with an embarrassed 
look, as not being able to explain how it got there.”) (quoted in Oxford English Dictionary Online at 
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/ 
50201986?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=relevancy&first=1&max_to_show=10). 
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court “confirmation mess”21 is sure to return to prominence in the 
Democrat-controlled Senate that will be constituted in early 2007, and 
following the 2008 presidential elections and beyond, the author hopes that 
the article will help establish a baseline for arguments about delays in the 
confirmation process, particularly when the White House and Senate are 
held by different political parties. 
Finally, the article offers some brief thoughts on which procedural 
aspects of the current judicial confirmation process likely contribute most 
to the problem of delay, and whether anything can, or even should, be done 
to modify those procedures. 
 
II. THE LOWER-COURT CONFIRMATION PROCESS 
 
A. Differences Between the Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices and 
Lower-Court Judges 
The differences between Supreme Court and lower-court confirmations 
begin with the language of the Constitution.  First, lower federal courts 
may not need to exist at all, since the Constitution only provides for “such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”22  The history of the United States Circuit Courts provides an 
illustration of this point.  With the passage of the first Judiciary Act in 
1789, Congress created thirteen United States District Courts judgeships, 
along with a six-justice United States Supreme Court,
23
 but Congress did 
not then provide for the appointment of separate Circuit Court judges.  
Instead, each of three geographically-based circuits was staffed with two 
“circuit riding” justices of the Supreme Court and a local District Court 
judge.  While the number of District Court judges was gradually increased 
during the following decade, the first separate United States Circuit Court 
judgeships, eighteen in number, were not created until 1801.
24
  And those 
circuit court positions, established by an outgoing Federalist majority in 
Congress in an attempt to strengthen the centralized federal government, 
were abolished the following year by a new Jeffersonian-Republican 
                                                 
21 See Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185 (1988). 
22 See U.S. CONST. art III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”).  Of course, much has been written about whether Congress could eliminate all federal 
lower-court jurisdiction, but that argument is well beyond the scope here. 
23 1 Stat. 73 (Sept. 24, 1789). 
24 Judiciary Act of 1801, 2 Stat. 89 (Feb. 13, 1801).  President John Adams‟ appointments during 
the waning days of his administration of “midnight judges” to fill the new positions created by the 
Judiciary Act of 1801 led to the Marbury v. Madison litigation, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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majority in Congress.
25
  No other circuit court judgeship existed until 1855, 
when the single-judge Circuit Court of California was created,
26
 and that 
court was also subsequently abolished, in 1863.
27
  The country remained 
without separate circuit court judgeships until 1869, when judges were 
appointed for each of the nine then-existing federal circuits.
28
  In 1891, 
those circuits were replaced by nine new “United States Circuit Courts of 
Appeals,”29 later renamed the United States Courts of Appeals.30  The 
combined number of District Court and Court of Appeals positions has 
risen since then from a total of fifty-six to 830. 
In addition to the fact that lower federal courts may not need to exist at 
all, the constitutionally-required procedure governing appointment and 
confirmation of lower-court judges is arguably different than that for 
Supreme Court justices.  Article II, Section 2, clause 2 provides that the 
President 
 
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and 
all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and 
which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may 
by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as 
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of 
Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 
 
Though there is much debate on this point, one reading of the 
appointments clause —and I would argue the most persuasive reading—is 
that “all other Officers” is the referent for “such inferior Officers.”  Under 
this reading of the text, lower-court judges might be nominated by the 
courts or cabinet heads, rather than the president.
31
  The constitutional 
                                                 
25 Act of Mar. 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 132.  In Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803), a Federalist-
dominated Supreme Court found the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801 constitutional. 
26 Act of Mar. 2, 1855, 10 Stat. 631 (“[T]o Establish a Circuit Court of the United States in and for 
the State of California”). 
27 Act of Mar. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 794 (“[T]o provide Circuit Courts for the Districts of California and  
Oregon . . . .”). 
28 Judiciary Act of 1869, 16 Stat. 44 (Apr. 10, 1869).   
29 Judiciary Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 826 (Mar. 3, 1891).   
30 62 Stat. 869, 870 (June 25, 1948). 
31 See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View Of Article III:  Separating the Two Tiers of 
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 235 n.103 (1985) (“An argument could be made that lower 
federal judges might be „inferior Officers‟ whose appointment could be vested by Congress in other 
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scheme establishing the federal courts, detailed above, supports this 
reading of the clause:  Congress should have more power over lower-court 
nominations, and lower-court judges should therefore be considered 
inferior officers, because Congress has the ability to eliminate the positions 
altogether under the Constitution.  The same cannot be said for positions 
specifically enumerated in the appointments clause. 
The debate at this point is truly academic, however.  Whether or not the 
power to nominate and appoint lower-court judges must be held by the 
president, the president has exercised such power since the creation of the 
lower federal courts in 1789.
32
  Still, the practice of nominating lower court 
judges has always differed practically from the Supreme Court nomination 
process,
33
 though the differences have perhaps diminished in recent 
times.
34
   
                                                                                                                
Article III judges.”); David S. Law, Appointing Federal Judges:  The President, the Senate, and the 
Prisoner‘s Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 479, 482 (2005) (“[T]he Appointments Clause confers on 
Congress the power to determine which offices, apart from those enumerated in the text of the clause 
itself, require Senate confirmation.”); Burke Shartel, Federal Judges--Appointment, Supervision, and 
Removal—Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 485, 499-529 (1930) (laying 
out the argument for lower-court judges as inferior officers in exhaustive detail); Paul Taylor, Filling 
Judicial Vacancies and Strengthening the Separation of Powers Through the Appointments Clause:  A 
Legislative Proposal, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL‟Y 227 (2003) (arguing that lower-court judges are 
inferior officers); Larry W. Yackle, Choosing Judges the Democratic Way, 69 B.U. L. REV. 273, 323 
(1989) (detailing textual reasons why lower-court judges need not be subject to the advice and consent 
requirement that applies to Supreme Court justices).  But see Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, 
Equity and Hierarchy:  Reflections on the Harris Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 255, 275 n.103 (1992) 
(arguing that lower-court judges are not “inferior officers”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Straightening Out 
The Confirmation Mess, 105 YALE L.J. 549, 565 n.49 (1995) (book review) (same). 
32 1 Stat. 73 (Sept. 24, 1789).  The 1789 Judiciary Act made no provisions for appointment of 
lower-court judges, leaving the default advice and consent procedure in place.  See JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 456 n.1 (1833):  
 
Whether the Judges of the inferior courts of the United States are . . . inferior 
officers . . . is a point, upon which no solemn judgment has ever been had.  The 
practical construction has uniformly been, that they are not such inferior 
officers.  And no act of congress prescribes the mode of their appointment 
(emphasis added).   
 
Justice Souter has cited this passage for the proposition that inferior court judges are not inferior 
officers under the Constitution.  Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 191 n.7 (1994) (Souter, J., 
concurring).  See also Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 807 n.232 (1999) 
(noting this issue without taking a position on the Constitution‟s construction).  Congress has 
formalized the respective roles of the Senate and President for lower court judges by statute.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 44(a) (“The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, circuit 
judges for the several circuits . . . .”); 28 U.S.C. § 133(a) (“The President shall appoint, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, district judges for the several judicial districts . . . .”). 
33 On the effectiveness of the Supreme Court appointment process, see Shartel, supra note 31, at 
486: 
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From the earliest years of the United States, although judicial 
nomination power has resided in the executive branch, senators have 
played a major role in giving “advice” to the president on potential judicial 
nominees within each senator‟s home state.  The practice may have arisen 
from the early days in which Supreme Court justices spent the bulk of their 
time providing lower federal court functions for specific geographic areas.  
Because seats on the Court became associated with particular regions, the 
senators from a given region sought to assert a controlling influence in the 
process for filling that region‟s seat.35  Senators also sought influence over 
other locally-based federal positions.
36
  The Senate as a whole enforced the 
practice of giving “advice” to the president by refusing to confirm to 
federal positions those who were not approved by their home-state 
senators.  As explored more fully below, this practice of “senatorial 
courtesy” has changed through the years, but its current manifestation is 
still an important consideration in lower-court appointments. 
Especially for District Court judges, until recently the senators for the 
state in which a vacancy was located provided the president with the names 
of possible nominees, and the same senators retained informal “veto” 
power over the final confirmation.
37
  This was especially true for senators 
                                                                                                                
Presidential appointment of Supreme Court justices, by and with the consent of 
the Senate, has worked well enough.  It is far from clear that a better way of 
choosing these justices could be found even if the Constitution were to be 
amended.  In making these important appointments both the President and the 
Senate assume that responsibility which, by the framers of the Constitution, they 
were intended to assume.  The dignity and power of the Supreme Court, the need 
for ability and fairness in its members, are so deeply appreciated that the 
President and Senate are apt to scrutinize carefully the qualifications of 
prospective appointees thereto. 
 
34 See Burbank, supra note 10, at 27 (“In any event, the result has been, or so it seems, that more 
and more nominations to the federal bench are now treated as if they were nominations to the Supreme 
Court . . . .”). 
35 Freund, supra note 5, at 1148 (“Thus parochialism combined with partisanship to shape 
appointments to the Court.”). 
36 William G. Ross, The Functions, Roles, and Duties of the Senate in the Supreme Court 
Appointment Process, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 633, 642 (1987) (“Only three months into its first 
term, the Senate established the precedent of „senatorial courtesy‟ by rejecting a highly qualified 
nominee for a naval position in Savannah because the two senators from Georgia preferred a different 
candidate.”). 
37 Kenneth C. Sears, The Appointment Of Federal District Judges, 25 ILL. L. REV. 54, 54-55 (1930) 
(“It is believed that today for all practical purposes in many if not most instances the senators from 
each state are really making the nominations to the federal district courts.”).  See also Shartel, supra 
note 31, at 488:   
 
Appointments of inferior judges and promotions to the circuit courts of appeal 
are dictated today by the senators from states where the vacancies exist, at least 
if they are influential and of the President‟s own party; if the senators are 
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of the president‟s party.38  Appellate judges followed much the same 
pattern, though the president has often had a larger role in those 
appointments.  Recently, however, the executive branch has taken a much 
stronger lead in collecting names of potential lower-court nominees, and in 
recent decades the Senate has, depending whether the political party of the 
president controlled that chamber, to a greater or lesser extent followed the 
president‟s plan.39 
Another way in which Supreme Court and lower court appointments 
have differed over the years is in the appearance of appointees before the 
Senate or a Senate committee during the confirmation process.  For over 
one hundred years following the nation‟s founding, judicial nominees, 
even nominees for the Supreme Court, did not appear before the Senate.
40
  
This changed in 1925 with President Coolidge‟s nomination of Harlan 
                                                                                                                
members of the opposition party, then naturally the President turns for 
„suggestions‟ to the local chiefs of his own party.   
 
This practice of deferring to home-state Senators with district court nominees is still followed.  As 
one former chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee has stated:  “I can tell you right now that when 
two Senators from any State fail to return a blue slip for a district court nominee, that is basically the 
end of that district court nominee.” 148 CONG. REC. S2209 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2002) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch). 
38 Burbank, supra note 10, at 26:  
 
With respect to nominations to the federal trial courts, the Senate‟s role has been 
dominated by patronage, backed up by the practice of “senatorial courtesy,” the 
so- called “blue slip” system giving a veto power to senators of the president‟s 
party from the nominee‟s state, and during some periods to senators from the 
other party as well. 
 
39 Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process:  Law Or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 
1208-09 (1988):  
 
The Senate‟s actual role in the conformation process depended upon the shifting 
balance of political power between Congress and the President.  The Senate‟s 
significant nineteenth-century role reflected the general congressional dominance 
of that era.  Scarcely one hundred years ago, Woodrow Wilson argued that 
national government was congressional government—more precisely, 
“government by the chairmen of the Standing Committees of Congress.”  Wilson 
put aside the President with the dismissive observation that his “business . . . 
occasionally great, is usually not much above routine.”  Although some such 
model of congressional government could be defended as late as the beginning of 
the New Deal, modern government is presidential government, at least in its 
most important aspects.  Presidential ascendancy in the appointment process 
reflects this fact (citations omitted). 
 
40 Judge John J. Parker, nominated to the Court by Herbert Hoover in 1930, asked to testify before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee and was refused.  So, too, George Williams in 1874 and John Harlan in 
1877.  Freund, supra note 5, at 1158 n.57, 1161. 
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Fiske Stone to the Supreme Court.
41
  Since the 1939 hearings for Justices 
Felix Frankfurter and William O. Douglas, nearly every Supreme Court 
nominee has appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
42
  Hearings 
for circuit, and now district, court appointees did not come into fashion 
until the last few decades.
43
  Even today, certain nominees receive very 
little consideration before the Judiciary Committee,
44
 though essentially all 
judicial nominees have at least nominal hearings. 
Of course, judicial appointments do not happen in a vacuum.  In 
addition to a stark increase in the number of federal court judges, the 
number of other officials requiring Senate confirmation has grown 
tremendously.  Plus, since the New Deal many areas of government have 
become increasingly federalized through expanding numbers of laws and 
administrative regulations, which increases the number of interactions 
between the president and the Senate.
45
  Once the judicial nominating 
process is seen as part of the everyday political process, withholding 
approval of nominations becomes another tool for the Senate, and 
individual senators, to use in furthering their political goals.  For example, 
during the 107
th
 Congress, the period under examination in this paper, 
Republicans held up appropriations bills in an effort to get Democrats to 
move more swiftly on judicial confirmations.
46
  
                                                 
41 GERHARDT, supra note 5, at 67.  
42 The exception is California Governor Earl Warren, who was not asked to appear during hearings 
in 1953 on his nomination to serve as Chief Justice.  Freund, supra note 5, at 1162.  
43 See John Anthony Maltese, Confirmation Gridlock:  The Federal Judicial Appointments Process 
Under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 6 (2003) (explaining that, 
before 1955, even testimony by Supreme Court nominees was rare). 
44 See generally Honorable Patricia M. Wald, Random Thoughts on a Random Process:  Selecting 
Appellate Judges, 6 J.L. & POL. 15 (1989). 
45 Cf. Calvin R. Massey, Getting There:  A Brief History Of The Politics Of Supreme Court 
Appointments, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 13 (1991): 
 
The nomination and confirmation process is an iterative dialogue between the 
President, the Senate, and often the Court.  Political and personal realities play a 
significant role in determining the relative strengths of the voices of the 
participants in the dialogue.  There is nothing historically anachronistic in Senate 
rejection of Presidential appointees; indeed, the Senate has sometimes dictated 
the nominee . . . .   
The [confirmation process] would be improved if both the President and the 
Senate were to recognize that they must take each other seriously.  When the 
President or the Senate has sought to ignore, spite, humiliate, or exploit the other, 
acrimony and poor appointments have resulted.   
 
46 See Paul Kane, Bush Pressed On Nominees; GOP Senators Urge Public Push for Judges, ROLL 
CALL, Sept. 10, 2001 (“But Senate Republicans say they are ready to do battle for their nominees, with 
or without a frontal attack by the White House.  [Senator] Craig said the GOP is ready to block more 
appropriations bills if [Senators] Daschle and Leahy don‟t live up to their agreement to move more 
 Journal of Law & Politics [Vol.XXII:341  352 
  
B. Senate Rules and Norms for the Confirmation of Lower-Court Judges 
Several rules of the Senate, both formal and informal, govern the 
process of confirming lower-court judges following their nomination by 
the president.
47
  There are many “vetogates” along the way where a 
nomination can be delayed or derailed.
48
    
The formal Senate Rules governing the treatment of judicial 
nominations are straightforward and do not inform the present discussion.
49
  
Senate Rule XXXI sets forth the general procedures for the handling of 
nominations on the floor, Rule XXV(k) establishes the jurisdiction of the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and Rule XXVI sets out the general 
rules of committee procedure.  The Judiciary Committee also has its own 
set of rules, but they are also very simple and not relevant to the important 
issues concerning nominations.
50
  Far more important than the formal rules 
of the Senate or Judiciary Committee are informal norms governing the 
nomination process, including “blue slipping,” holds, filibusters, and the 
general idea of “senatorial courtesy.” 
The first potential vetogates, or potential tools of obstruction, are found 
in the Judiciary Committee.  Judicial nominations are automatically 
referred to the committee under Senate rules.
51
  Several things can happen 
to derail a nomination at this point.
52
  First, the chairman of the committee 
                                                                                                                
nominees.  „We don't want to do that, but that certainly is the right of the minority,‟ Craig said. „I 
believe we have the 41 votes to cause certain actions.‟”).  But cf. Alan Gura, Choosing Better Judges, 
12 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 25-27 (Mar. 14, 2001) (contending that judicial nominations should not be 
“horse traded”). 
47 The same rules apply to the nominations of Supreme Court justices, but those far rarer 
nominations have a much higher profile and thus their own set of “rules” not applicable here.  For 
example, a Supreme Court nomination would likely never be killed by the Judiciary Committee 
chairman or even the Majority Leader.  The nomination would be sent to Senate for vote.  See infra 
note 58 (discussing historic practice with respect to floor votes for Supreme Court nominations). 
48 Scholars of the legislative process have developed the term “vetogate” (sometimes “veto gate”) 
to describe any point in the legislative process where, due to constitutional requirements or legislative 
rules or norms, consent of an individual (e.g., the chairman of a congressional committee) or group 
(e.g., a congressional committee or either house of Congress) is needed for legislation to pass.  If 
consent is denied, the legislation is effectively “vetoed.”  See Barry R. Weingast et al., Positive 
Canons:  The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 707 n.5 
(1992). 
49 STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 106-15, (2d Sess. 2000), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/Standing_Rules_Senate.htm. 
50 S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RULES OF PROCEDURE, available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/ 
committee_rules.cfm.   
51 STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, Rule XXV(l)(5), supra note 49. 
52 See Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent:  Senate Responses to Executive 
Branch Nominations 1885-1996, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1122, 1125:  
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can delay setting a hearing date, or can refuse to set one at all.
53
  A 
majority of senators on the Judiciary Committee can force the chairman to 
schedule a hearing,
54
 but this type of compulsion is extraordinary in the 
Senate.
55
  Because of the principle of unlimited debate, the Senate acts 
much of the time by unanimous consent.  Thus, any aggressive behavior by 
a senator or group of senators against the chairman is likely to lead to 
reciprocal actions to punish those senators in the future. 
Eventually, of course, enough pressure may be brought to bear on the 
Chairman to schedule a hearing.  Hearings for lower-court nominees were 
the exception, rather than the rule, until relatively recently.
56
  Now, 
however, every judicial nominee who will eventually be considered by the 
Senate as a whole receives a Judiciary Committee hearing first.  Following 
the hearing, the Committee must vote whether to approve the nominee, and 
if not, whether to nevertheless send the nominee without approval to the 
full Senate for a confirmation vote.  A majority vote of the Judiciary 
Committee is required to allow the nomination to leave the Committee.  In 
an exceptional case, the Committee might allow a lower-court nomination 
to go to the full Senate even if the nominee failed to win a majority vote in 
the Committee, but generally a failure to win approval from Judiciary 
Committee is the final step for a lower-court nominee.  This summary 
rejection contrasts with the Committee practice concerning nominations of 
Supreme Court justices, where the Committee traditionally has always sent 
nominations to the full Senate, even with a negative or evenly divided vote 
                                                                                                                
The use of committees to examine the qualifications for nominations also 
provides opportunities for recalcitrant Senators to engage in institutional heel 
dragging . . . .  Committees and committee chairs have discretion about when or 
even if to hold hearings.  While nominations can be formally discharged from 
committee, this procedure occurs very infrequently and usually after the process 
has been long delayed. 
 
53 There is no requirement in either the Senate or Judiciary Committee Rules that the Chairman set 
or hold a hearing for any judicial nominee. 
54 See JUDICIARY COMM. RULE IV, supra note 50: 
 
BRINGING A MATTER TO A VOTE.  The Chairman shall entertain a non-
debatable motion to bring a matter before the Committee to a vote.  If there is 
objection to bring the matter to a vote without further debate, a roll call vote of 
the Committee shall be taken, and debate shall be terminated if the motion to 
bring the matter to a vote without further debate passes with ten votes in the 
affirmative, one of which must be cast by the minority. 
 
55 See, e.g., Denning, supra note 13, at 34 n.146. 
56 See discussion supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. 
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of the Committee on the merits of the nomination.
57
  A prominent example 
of this practice is Clarence Thomas‟s nomination to the Supreme Court.  
Although the Democrat-led Judiciary Committee deadlocked over Thomas 
by a seven to seven vote, the Committee nevertheless voted thirteen to one 
to send the nomination to the Senate floor,
58
 where, after long hearings, the 
entire Senate narrowly voted to confirm. 
In the case of lower-court judges, in contrast, even when a majority of 
the Senate is prepared to confirm a nominee, the Judiciary Committee will 
generally stand by its negative recommendation and refuse to allow the full 
Senate to vote.  This happened on occasion during the 107
th
 Congress, 
during the seventeen months in which Democrats controlled the Senate 
following Senator Jeffords‟s defection from the Republican ranks in May 
2001.
59
  During this period, Committee votes on nominations that were not 
sent to the floor were generally party-line votes which recognized the 
Democrats‟ single-vote majority.  Interestingly, apparently no nominations 
were defeated in the Judiciary Committee during the last six years of the 
Clinton presidency, when Republicans controlled the Judiciary 
Committee.
60
  Instead, Chairman Orrin Hatch simply did not hold a vote—
and often did not even hold hearings—when a nominee did not have 
support in the Committee.
61
 
While the chairman of the Judiciary Committee has broad discretion in 
setting hearing dates and votes for nominations, even if he personally 
supports a nominee he can be constrained by informal vetogates at the 
committee level that can prevent nominations from being sent to the floor.  
For example, the candidate‟s Judiciary Committee file must be completed.  
                                                 
57 See 107 CONG. REC. S7286 (daily ed. June 29, 2001) (statement of Sen. Lott) (“No matter what 
the vote in committee on a Supreme Court nominee, it is the precedent of the Senate that the individual 
nominated is given a vote by the whole Senate.”) (attaching research memorandum from the 
Congressional Reference Service); id. (statement of Sen. Daschle): 
 
It has been the traditional practice of the Judiciary Committee to report Supreme 
Court nominees to the Senate floor once the committee has completed its 
consideration.  This has been true even for a number of nominees that were 
defeated in the Judiciary Committee.  Now, Senators Leahy and Hatch have put 
in writing their intention that consideration of Supreme Court nominees will 
follow the practices and precedents of the Judiciary Committee and the Senate. 
 
58 Neil A. Lewis, The Thomas Nomination; Judiciary Panel Deadlocks, 7-7, On Thomas 
Nomination to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1991, at 11. 
59 See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S8280-81 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 2002) (statement of Sen. Sessions) 
(discussing the defeat in committee of Priscilla Owen‟s nomination to the Fifth Circuit). 
60 See discussion of Sen. Lott‟s and Sen. Hatch‟s claims, infra notes 192-96 and accompanying 
text. 
61 Id. 
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The Committee sends each nominee a detailed questionnaire to answer, 
and each nominee must also be screened by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.  In addition, from the Eisenhower to the Clinton 
administrations, the president has always submitted the names of potential 
nominees to the Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary of the American 
Bar Association for evaluation and recommendation, and the ABA report 
has been considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee during the 
confirmation process.
62
  In March 2001, the Bush II administration rejected 
this long tradition of ABA advance review of nominees.
63
  However, since 
that time Democratic senators have refused to proceed on nominations 
without ABA evaluations, and this  has led to additional delays in the 
process.
64
 
Another committee-level vetogate is the practice of “blue-slipping.”65  
Since at least the 1950s, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee has sent 
blue slips of paper to both of the home-state senators of the nominee.  For 
nominations to the Courts of Appeals, which cover multiple states, the 
slips go to senators for the state in which the newly-confirmed judge‟s 
chambers would be located.  Before scheduling a hearing, the Chairman 
waits for the senators to return the two blue slips.
66
  If a senator chooses to 
withhold a blue slip, the nomination is effectively killed.  The exact effect 
of withholding a blue slip has changed over time, because chairmen have 
given more or less weight to views of senators not of the president‟s own 
party.  The blue-slipping procedure has also been the subject of recent 
proposals for change, and the 107
th
 Congress made a significant 
modification in the procedure by requiring that slips be made public.
67
 
                                                 
62 See ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary website, http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/ 
home.html. 
63 Neil Lewis & David Johnston, Bush Would Sever Law Group‘s Role in Screening Judges, N.Y. 
TIMES, March 17, 2001, at A1; Neil Lewis, White House Ends Bar Association‘s Role in Screening 
Federal Judges, N.Y. TIMES, March 23, 2001, at A13; Mark Preston, Specter Seeks A.B.A. Role in 
Nominations, ROLL CALL, May 3, 2001 (discussing the reinstatement of “ABA‟s role of vetting District 
Court nominees”). 
64 See infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text. 
65 Two exceptional articles on blue-slipping are Brannon P. Denning, The ―Blue Slip‖:  Enforcing 
the Norms of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75 (2001), and Elliot E. 
Slotnick, The Changing Role of the Senate Judiciary Committee in Judicial Selection, 62 JUDICATURE 
502 (1979). 
66 Interestingly, the blue slips of paper actually have instructions stating that if a slip is not returned 
within a week detailing a Senator‟s concerns about a nominee, it will be assumed that the Senator has 
no objection to the nominee.  Slotnick, supra note 65, at 505.  In practice, however, a Chairman will 
not schedule hearings without the return of both blue slips. 
67 Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and Sen. Orrin Hatch, Ranking 
Minority Member, announced the change in a “Dear Colleague” letter to the body of the Senate:  
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Similar in effect to the blue-slip process is the more general procedure 
by which any senator may request a “hold” on consideration of any matter 
scheduled to come before the Senate or a committee.  The procedure arose 
from situations in which senators foresaw their absence during an 
important vote and would ask the majority leader—either directly or, if a 
member of the minority caucus, by asking the minority leader—to “hold” 
the vote until the senator returned.
68
  Due to the tradition of unlimited 
debate in the Senate, and the concomitant ability to filibuster, such requests 
for holds have generally been honored. 
Because senatorial holds involve often informal, oral communication 
between an individual senator and his caucus leader, little is known about 
the early use of this practice.  However, it is clear that in recent times this 
procedure has frequently been used to derail judicial nominations.  Large 
numbers of nominees have languished under anonymous holds, with only 
the majority or minority leader knowing why the hold had been placed or 
how it might be removed.
69
  There has been pressure on leaders of both 
parties to make all anonymous holds public, including those on judicial 
nominations.
70
  Of course, even if anonymous holds are disallowed, 
senators might still use public holds to delay consideration of 
nominations.
71
   
Holds are particularly interesting because senators sometimes use them 
even if the “holding” senator favors a particular nominee.  The hold might 
                                                                                                                
DEAR COLLEAGUE: We write as Chairman and Ranking Republican Member 
of the Judiciary Committee to inform you of a change in Committee practice 
with respect to nominations. The “blue slips” that the Committee has 
traditionally sent to home State Senators to ask their views on nominees to be 
U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Marshals and federal judges, will be treated as public 
information.  
We both believe that such openness in the confirmation process will benefit the 
Judiciary Committee and the Senate as a whole. Further, it is our intention that 
this policy of openness with regard to “blue slips” and the blue slip process 
continue in the future, regardless of who is Chairman or which party is in the 
majority in the Senate.  
Therefore, we write to inform you that the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, 
with the full support of the former Chairman and Ranking Republican Member, 
is exercising his authority to declare that the blue slip process shall no longer be 
designated or treated as Committee confidential.  
 
107 CONG. REC. S7285 (daily ed. June 29, 2001). 
68 Denning, supra note 65, at 20-1 & n.95. 
69 Cf. 148 CONG. REC. S278 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“I am encouraged 
that this confirmation today was not delayed by extended, unexplained, anonymous holds on the Senate 
Executive Calendar, the type of hold that characterized so much of the previous 6-1⁄2 years.”). 
70 See, e.g., 152 Cong. Rec. S1872-S1881 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006) (discussing Amendment No. 
2944 to the Legislative Transparency and Accountability Act of 2006). 
71 See examples infra note 224. 
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be placed in an attempt to get another senator, or even the president, to act 
on an entirely different legislative matter.  Action on nominations, like 
action on any matter pending before a legislative body, is subject to the 
constant applications and counter-applications of political pressure that 
mark our form of government, particularly in the Senate due to its tradition 
of unlimited debate. 
Even if a nomination passes to the full Senate, it may not immediately 
come up for vote.  First, the Majority Leader, on his own initiative or 
pursuant to a hold, could refuse to schedule a vote of the full Senate.  And, 
while the Majority Leader of the Senate has a great deal of power over the 
confirmation process once it reaches the Senate floor, a determined 
minority can temporarily or even indefinitely delay action on any Senate 
decision by filibuster or threat of filibuster.
72
  Currently, debate on any 
matter before the Senate may not be cut off without a cloture vote by sixty 
senators,
73
 and a filibuster threat is generally enough to cause the majority 
leader to defer consideration of a matter that needs to come before the full 
Senate.
74
 
Where no vote is scheduled by the end of a session of Congress or any 
other period for which the Senate recesses for more than thirty days, the 
nomination is by rule “returned” to the president, and no further action can 
be taken on the nominee unless the president renominates the candidate.
75
  
However, the Senate generally agrees by unanimous consent to suspend 
this rule and extend the nominations beyond the major summer and winter 
breaks of a given Congress.
76
  
                                                 
72 For an exhaustive discussion of all aspects of the filibuster, see generally Catherine Fisk & 
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181 (1997). 
73 STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, Rule XXII, supra note 49. 
74 Republicans forced cloture votes on filibustered judicial nominees during the 108th Congress, but 
Democrats were able to sustain the filibusters.  See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S11463-4 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 
2004). 
75 STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, Rule XXXI(6), supra note 49: 
 
Nominations neither confirmed nor rejected during the session at which they are 
made shall not be acted upon at any succeeding session without being again 
made to the Senate by the President; and if the Senate shall adjourn or take a 
recess for more than thirty days, all nominations pending and not finally acted 
upon at the time of taking such adjournment or recess shall be returned by the 
Secretary to the President, and shall not again be considered unless they shall 
again be made to the Senate by the President. 
 
See also McCarty & Razaghian, supra note 52, at 1125 (“Under the Senate‟s standing rule 38(6), 
nominations that have not been confirmed or rejected expire during any Senate recess exceeding thirty 
days.  These nominations therefore fail unless the president formally resubmits them.”). 
76 An exception to the general retention of nominees over Congressional recesses came in the 
summer of 2001.  147 CONG. REC. S8888-91 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2001). 
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Finally, even after a successful vote of confirmation, in theory any 
senator who voted to confirm a judicial nominee might afterwards make a 
motion for reconsideration.
77
  In practice, though, this rule does not usually 
have any effect, as such a motion is immediately made and “laid on the 
table” following each successful confirmation vote.78 
With this brief overview of Senate processes for handling lower-court 
judicial nominations, we now turn to the core of this article, evaluating the 
rhetoric used by senators when characterizing delay in lower-court 
confirmations.  
 
III. LIES, DAMN LIES, AND STATISTICS OF THE 107TH CONGRESS
79
 
 
President George W. Bush‟s first two years in office, from 2001 to 
2002, the period of the 107
th
 Congress, are an interesting time period for 
which to examine the political maneuverings that suffuse the debate over 
lower-court judicial nominations.  First, the 2000 presidential election was 
tightly contested.  Bush, the Republican candidate, lost the national 
popular vote to Democratic candidate Al Gore by some 340,000 votes yet 
won in the Electoral College by a vote of 271 to 266.
80
  The Electoral 
                                                 
77 STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, Rule XXIII(1), supra note 49. 
78 But see Sheldon Goldman, Reagan‘s Second Term Judicial Appointments:  The Battle At 
Midway, 70 JUDICATURE 324, 336 (1987), for a good story of a motion to reconsider being used 
strategically by Senator Robert Byrd in 1986 to delay the confirmation of Seventh Circuit nominee 
Daniel A. Manion. 
79 MARK TWAIN, MARK TWAIN‟S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 246 (1924) (“There are three kinds of lies: lies, 
damned lies, and statistics” (attributing quotation to Benjamin Disraeli).).  See also 148 CONG. REC. 
S3527 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2002) (statement of Sen. Specter): 
 
[I]n my Senate tenure we have had three situations where the White House and 
the Senate were controlled by different parties.  When there is debate about what 
has happened [with judicial appointments] and how long the nominations have 
taken, although I have been here and followed the situation closely, I get lost in 
the statistics.  I think the American people do too. 
 
148 CONG. REC. S3548 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2002) (statement of Sen. Reid):  
 
I have always been very dubious of numbers because even as one who did not 
have a degree in engineering or did not do much in the way of math in high 
school or college, I can still do a lot of things with numbers.  We can manipulate 
numbers—you know that is easy to do.  We can have all kinds of numbers 
games. 
 
148 CONG. REC. S4113 (daily ed. May 9, 2002) (statement of Sen. Lott) (“I have learned over the 
years that when you are talking about judges and judicial nominations each side will have their 
statistics about what happened in the Clinton years, what happened in the Reagan years, and what 
happens right now.”). 
80 Editorial, The Case for the Electoral College, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2000, at A34. 
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College victory, however, came only after a divided United States Supreme 
Court on December 12 ordered the state of Florida to cease a state-court-
ordered recount, leaving Bush with a 537-vote margin in Florida and 
therefore that state‟s twenty-five Electoral College votes.81  With such a 
narrowly elected president, and thus less of a presidential mandate, the 
chances were greater that Senate preferences would strongly influence the 
judicial selection process.
82
 
Second, the even political division of the country illustrated by the 
presidential election was also reflected in the composition of the Senate 
following the 2000 elections, with Republicans and Democrats divided 
fifty to fifty for the first time in the history of the Senate.
83
  Because the 
newly-elected Vice President, Dick Cheney, could break any tie vote in his 
role as President of the Senate, the Senate by unanimous consent allowed 
Republicans to chair all Senate committees,
84
 although the membership of 
each committee was evenly split between the parties.
85
  As with the 
country‟s close decision on the choice of president, the evenly divided 
Senate would likely serve to bring into focus any debates over judicial 
nominations. 
The 107
th
 Congress is also a fruitful era to study judicial nominations 
because the nine justices of the Supreme Court had in 2000 been together 
for over six and one-half years, a very long time between Supreme Court 
vacancies.
86
  Many pundits believed that one or more seats on the Court 
would need to be filled during Bush‟s term as president, and commentators 
predicted that both parties would treat early lower-court nomination battles 
as a “warm up” for the Supreme Court confirmation fights that would 
follow if a justice retired or passed away.
87
 
                                                 
81 R.W. Apple, Jr., The 43rd President: News Analysis; Now, Lifting the Clouds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
14, 2000, at A1. 
82 Neil A. Lewis, Hurdles to Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2001, at A10 (As Senator Leahy 
predicted during the 107th Congressional session, “I think the closeness of the election and the ill will 
engendered by the Supreme Court is going to make it difficult for the new administration to make some 
clear ideological stamp on the courts.”). 
83 147 CONG. REC. S1 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2001); 147 CONG. REC. S29 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2001).  There 
had been a 48-48 division of the Senate in 1953. 
84 S. Res. 7, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. S8 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2001). 
85 S. Res. 8, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. S48 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2001); see also 147 CONG. REC. 
S53-S54 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 2001). 
86 Ultimately, no vacancy occurred until Chief Justice William Rehnquist‟s death in September 
2005.   
87 148 CONG. REC. S1234 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2002 ) (statement of Sen. Specter) (“[O]ne never 
knows—but in looking at the proceedings as to Judge Pickering, this may be a warm-up for the next 
Supreme Court nomination.”); cf. Robin Toner, Interest Groups Set for Battle on a Supreme Court 
Vacancy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2001, at A1 (quoting an activist who characterized the fight over John  
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Finally, the balance of the Senate swung back to the Democrats when 
Vermont Republican Jim Jeffords renounced his party membership on May 
24, 2001, and became the Senate‟s lone independent.  With the Senate now 
split 50-49-1 in favor of the Democrats, with whom Jeffords agreed to 
caucus, committees were reformed with Democratic majorities and 
chairpersons.  Thus, the 107
th
 Congress provides the rare opportunity to 
look at judicial appointments when the president‟s party and the opposition 
party each had control of the Senate advise-and-consent apparatus for at 
least some period of time. 
In telling the story of judicial nominations in the 107
th
 Congress, this 
paper focuses on arguments made by senators of both parties that purport 
to be based on numerical comparisons between the Senate‟s past and 
present timeliness with respect to judicial confirmations.  The next section 
points out a number of “confirmation process fallacies” repeatedly invoked 
by senators in their efforts to score political points from issues that arise 
during the confirmation process.  The article also identifies “confirmation 
process relevancies”88 in hopes that future debates about delay in the 
judicial confirmation process can be grounded in meaningful statistics 
rather than the trivial and irrelevant. 
 
A. 107th Congress, 1st Session (2001) 
The Fall 2000 Congressional elections resulted in a Democratic Party 
net gain of four seats in the Senate, leaving that body split evenly between 
the Democrats and Republicans.  The first session of the 107
th
 Congress 
convened on January 3, 2001, with outgoing Vice President Al Gore taking 
the chair in his capacity as Senate President.
89
  Because the new 
Republican president and vice president would not be sworn in until 
January 20, 2001, Senate committees were chaired by Democrats until 
noon on that date, with Republican chairs named to then take over, 
reflecting the ability of the Vice President to break any ties on the floor of 
the Senate following the new administration‟s inauguration.90   
Discussions continued in early January 2001 between Trent Lott and 
Tom Daschle—the Republican and Democratic leaders of the Senate, 
respectively—over the exact membership and rules that would govern the 
Senate committees following the Republican takeover.  On January 5, the 
                                                                                                                
Ashcroft‟s 2001 nomination for Attorney General as “a very conscious practice run”).  See generally 
Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection As War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667 (2003). 
88 See Twain, supra note 20. 
89 147 CONG. REC. S1 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2001). 
90 S. Res. 7, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. S7 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2001). 
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leaders finally reached an agreement which provided for committees split 
evenly between the parties but chaired by Republicans.
91
  The Judiciary 
Committee was to be chaired, as it had been during the final six years of 
the Clinton presidency, by Republican Orrin Hatch of Utah. 
The initial work of any Judiciary Committee following an election that 
produces a new administration is to confirm certain important executive-
branch officials, such as the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, and 
various assistants and deputies within the Justice Department.  On January 
29, 2001, Bush II sent over his nomination of former Senator John 
Ashcroft to be Attorney General.  This selection was followed by the 
March 13 nomination of Theodore Olson to be Solicitor General, Larry D. 
Thompson‟s nomination for Deputy Attorney General on March 22, and 
the nominations of a handful of Assistant Attorneys General through the 
end of April. 
Bush II sent his first judicial nominations to the Senate, for eleven 
circuit court positions, on May 9, 2001.
92
  By June 22nd he had made 
                                                 
91 S. Res. 8, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. S41-S42 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2001).  In pertinent part, the 
agreement specified  the following: 
 
Sec. 1.  All Senate committees would be “composed equally of members of both 
parties” appointed by the respective leaders and would have equal budgets and 
office space.  Committee Chairs would have the right to place on the full 
committee‟s agenda “any Legislative or Executive Calendar item which has not 
been reported because of a tie vote” in a subcommittee.   
Sec. 2.  If the composition of the Senate changed so that one party gained a 
majority, “then each committee ratio shall be adjusted to reflect the ratio of the 
parties in the Senate, and the provisions of this resolution shall have no further 
effect, except that the members appointed by the two Leaders, pursuant to this 
resolution, shall no longer be members of the committees, and the committee 
chairmanships shall be held by the party which has attained a majority of the 
whole number of Senators.” 
Sec. 3.  If a committee did not report out an item or nomination because of a tie 
vote, then either of the leaders could make a motion to discharge, which would 
be voted on under limited debate rules.  If the discharge motion succeeded, the 
original item or nomination would be placed immediately on the appropriate 
Senate calendar. Cloture motions (to cut off unlimited debate) were prohibited 
“on an amendable item during its first 12 hours of Senate debate.”  Also, both 
leaders would “seek to attain an equal balance of the interests of the two parties 
when scheduling and debating . . . .” 
 
92 Note that references made throughout the remainder of the article are to nominations to the 
United States District Courts and the United States Courts of Appeal, including the Federal Circuit.  
Not included are nominations to the Territorial Courts, the Court of Federal Claims, the Court of 
International Trade, the Tax Court, or the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.  Any unsourced 
numerical claims or statistics are derived from an appointments dataset kept by the author, based on 
materials from an electronic database kept by the United States Senate Library, cross-checked and 
supplemented with data from the Congressional Record and from a dataset maintained by the Federal 
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another fifteen nominations, eight of which were for appellate judgeships.  
Compared to the past, this was a torrid pace for the nomination of federal 
judges, and in particular judges of the Courts of Appeals.  For example, 
President Reagan nominated his first judges on July 1, 1981, and did not 
reach eleven circuit court nominations until a year after he entered office, 
by which time he had also made thirty-six district court nominations.  Bush 
I sent his first new lower-court nominees to the Senate on August 4, 
1989,
93
 and did not reach eleven circuit court nominees until fifteen 
months after taking office, by which time he had made a total of forty 
nominations.  President Clinton sent his first judicial nomination to the 
Senate in August 1993, and his eleventh circuit court nomination the 
following March.  Clinton had nominated a total of sixty-nine lower-court 
judges by that date.  In contrast, by approximately the same point in his 
presidency, March 21, 2002, Bush II had nominated ninety-seven judges, 
and twenty-nine had been to the Courts of Appeals. 
Following Bush II‟s early nominations, the Republican-led Judiciary 
Committee noticed its first hearing for judicial nominees for May 23, 2001, 
the day before Senator Jeffords left the Republican Party and became an 
independent.
94
  However, the hearing was postponed by request of 
Committee Democrats,
95
 and it was not immediately rescheduled following 
the change to Democratic control of the Senate.  After Jeffords‟s switch, 
much committee business in the Senate came to a halt while party leaders 
worked on a new organizing resolution.
96
  This process took some time.
97
  
                                                                                                                
Judicial Center, entitled HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY.  See website of the Federal Judicial 
Center, http://www.fjc.gov. 
93 On February 28, 1990, Bush I renominated four Reagan nominees who had not been confirmed 
at the end of the prior congress.  While technically nominees of Bush I, their early nominations reflect 
the fact that they had already been selected by the previous administration, and therefore the August 4 
nominees more accurately represent the “first” Bush I nominees.  If the February 28, 1989, nominees 
are counted, the eleventh Bush I nominee to the Court of Appeals was made on February 20, 1990, 
when a total of thirty-five lower-court judges had been nominated. 
94 147 CONG. REC. D502 (daily ed. May 23, 2001) (hearings on the nominations of Deborah L. 
Cook and Jeffrey S. Sutton, each to be a United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, and the 
nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be United States Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia 
Circuit). 
95 Confirmation Hearing on Federal Appointments:  Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 3 (2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
96 Some committees were able to meet and confirm executive branch nominees, but the Judiciary 
Committee did not meet for the purposes of judicial hearings.  Cf. 148 CONG. REC. S2937, S2937 
(statement of Sen. Hatch). 
97 See Paul Kane, Lott‘s Push for Judges Imperils Partisan Truce, ROLL CALL, Oct. 4, 2001 
(“Leahy has taken an almost personal offense to Republicans who have questioned his pace in 
confirming judges.  He wasn‟t able to hold any judicial nomination hearings until early July, after the 
GOP had put up a four-week fight over the reorganization of committees when Democrats claimed the 
majority in early June.”).   
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Under the terms of the original organizing resolutions of the 107
th
 Senate,
98
 
if one party gained the majority at any time during either the 2001 or 2002 
congressional session, committee chairmanships went to that party and all 
committees reverted to their previous memberships from the 106
th
 
Congress.
99
  Because the Republicans had majorities on all committees 
during the 106
th
 Congress, immediately after the Jeffords switch the Senate 
had Democratic chairs of committees with Republican majorities.  And 
because the organization of the Senate is established by unanimous 
consent, the Republicans had the ability to hold up any further 
reorganization in order to get some concessions.
100
   
Republican senators demanded concessions over judicial confirmations 
because they were concerned that the newly-Democratic-controlled 
Judiciary Committee would use its power to hold up appointments.
101
  
                                                 
98 S. Res. 7, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC.  S7 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2001); S. Res. 8, 107th Cong., 147 
CONG. REC.  S48 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2001). 
99 S. Res. 8, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC.  S48 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2001) (In the event of one party 
gaining a majority, “the [committee] members appointed by the two Leaders, pursuant to this 
resolution, shall no longer be members of the committees, and the committee chairmanships shall be 
held by the party which has attained a majority of the whole number of Senators.”). 
100 See Dave Boyer, Senate GOP to Make Push to Help Bush‘s Judge Picks; Hopes to Gain 
Leverage From Brief Committee Majority, WASH. TIMES, Jun. 5, 2001, at A1:   
 
Republicans want a guarantee that Mr. Bush‟s current and future nominees will 
be brought up for floor votes.  And they believe an unusual feature of the 
midterm power shift gives the GOP added leverage: Until both parties agree to a 
reorganization, Democrats will chair committees with Republican majorities . . . . 
And 11 freshman senators who received their committee assignments this year, 
including Democrat Hillary Rodham Clinton of New York, would be left without 
any such posts for the time being. 
“It‟s completely wild,” said a former Senate Republican leadership aide.  
“They‟re not going to get this resolved this week.  If you think that at noon 
Wednesday Hillary will have a committee assignment, you‟re under an illusion.”   
 
See also 147 CONG. REC. 7993 (daily ed. July 20, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“I sent out 
official notice of the Committee‟s first hearing on judicial nominations within 10 minutes after 
Majority Leader Daschle announced that an agreement had been reached on reorganization.  The 
hearing was held the day after Committee membership assignments were completed earlier this 
month.”).  But see 147 CONG. REC. 7994 (daily ed. July 20, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (arguing 
that Sen. Leahy should have held nominations hearings during the reorganization period, when they 
would have had Republican majorities: “[I]t appears that the decision not to hold hearings on nominees 
was simply a calculated tactic to delay President Bush‟s nominees.”). 
101 See Noelle Straub, Senate Agrees to Floor Vote on Impasse, THE HILL, June 20, 2001.  See also 
Paul Kane, Chairman Says Fight Over Reorganization is Delaying Progress, ROLL CALL, June 25, 
2001: 
 
Democrats are hoping to pin the blame on Senate Republicans who are holding 
out for a better deal on the committee resolution in their negotiations with 
Majority Leader Thomas Daschle (D-S.D.).  “We could have had four or five or 
six [judicial nomination] hearings already if we hadn‟t had this,” Leahy said of 
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While there were no formal rule changes in response to the Republican 
concerns, incoming Democratic Judiciary Committee chair Senator Patrick 
Leahy did assuage some fears by placing a “Dear Colleague” letter in the 
Congressional Record.  In the letter, also signed by Senator Orrin Hatch, 
the ranking Republican member of the Judiciary Committee, Senator 
Leahy agreed that the “blue slip” process would no longer be confidential, 
and also that any Supreme Court nominees would be sent from the 
Committee to the floor of the Senate for consideration, even if they were 
opposed by a majority of the Judiciary Committee.
102
  With these two 
important agreements in place, the Senate on June 29, 2001, was able to 
pass by unanimous consent a resolution providing for the reorganization of 
Senate committees with Democratic majorities.
103
 
The Judiciary Committee met under Democratic control for the first 
time on July 11, 2001.
104
  Almost immediately, Republicans began 
complaining about the slow pace of judicial confirmations.  On July 16, 
Senator Kyl of Arizona, though claiming that he did not “want to point any 
fingers in the spirit of bipartisanship which I am invoking here today,” 
noted that no lower-court judges had yet been confirmed even though the 
Senate was “past the midway point of this year.”105  Two days later, 
Senator Sessions of Alabama complained that only three judges had come 
out of the Judiciary Committee in seven months.
106
  Around this time, 
Republicans also directed criticism at the Judiciary Committee‟s failure to 
move forward on executive-branch nominations, as well.
107
   
                                                                                                                
the negotiations.  He added in reference to Bush: “His own party is blocking him 
from [us] holding nomination hearings.”  Republicans, however, contend that 
Democratic statements regarding GOP nominations since retaking the majority 
have left them with no other strategy than to risk a short-term logjam for the 
long-term benefit of securing the safest route for Bush's judges. 
 
102 147 CONG. REC. S7285 (daily ed. June 29, 2001) (reproducing the full text of Leahy‟s letter). 
103 Sen. R. 120, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. S7285-86 (daily ed. June 29, 2001). 
104 147 CONG. REC. D 684 (daily ed. July 11, 2001) (The hearing was for Roger L. Gregory, 
nominated to be United States Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit, and Richard F. Cebull and Sam E. 
Haddon, each nominated to be a United States District Judge for the District of Montana.  These were 
not controversial nominees: Gregory was originally a Clinton nominee and had been renominated by 
Bush II in a gesture of bipartisanship, and Cebull and Haddon had enthusiastic bipartisan support from 
their home-state senators, Burns (Rep.) and Baucus (Dem.).)  See 147 CONG. REC. S7994 (daily ed. 
July 20, 2001) (statement of Sen. Baucus). 
105 147 CONG. REC. S7664 (daily ed. July 16, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
106 147 CONG. REC. S7890 (daily ed. July 18, 2001) (statement of Sen. Sessions).   
107 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S8037 (daily ed. July 23, 2001) (statement of Sen. Craig referring to 
the June 5, 2001, nomination of John Walters to be the Nation‟s drug czar) (“The Judiciary Committee 
does not appear to be functioning well.  We have had changes in chairmanships, but the new chairman 
has had plenty of time.  Just send out a notice, bring down the gavel, listen to this man and question this 
man about what he will do . . . .”). 
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Although true as far as they went, the Kyl and Sessions criticisms in 
July 2001 were misleading.  As discussed above, in the previous three 
administrations no judicial nominations had even been sent to the Senate 
until July or August, sixth months after each president took office.  The 
first Judiciary Committee hearing during Reagan‟s first term was on July 
14,
108
 the first Judiciary Committee hearing for Bush I was not until 
September 26,
109
 and Clinton‟s first hearing for judicial nominees in 1993 
was not until September 23.
110
  Especially given Jeffords‟s defection from 
the Republican Party and the more than month-long reorganization of the 
Senate during June and July, it was unremarkable that little in the way of 
judicial confirmation activity had taken place in mid-July 2001 at either the 
committee or full Senate level.
111
  Thus we have the first of our 
paradigmatic false arguments (“fallacies”) about delay in the judicial 
confirmation process: 
 
1. Fallacy #1 (―Dog Days‖) 
Failing to take into consideration that the main business of lower-court 
judicial confirmations during the first year of a new presidency does not 
take place until late fall. 
 
Senator Kyl stepped up the pressure on the Democratic-led Judiciary 
Committee the following week.  On July 23, 2001, he noted that there were 
108 vacancies in the federal courts, which was “about 45 or so more than 
there were at the end of the Clinton administration.”112  Kyl also quoted 
Democratic senators who had complained of delay during the Clinton 
administration, when Republicans controlled the Judiciary Committee.  For 
example, Kyl noted that Senator Daschle had claimed in March 2000 that a 
“failure to fill [open judicial] vacancies is straining our Federal court 
system and delaying justice for people all across this country.”  According 
                                                 
108 Confirmation of Federal Judges (Part 1):  Hearings on the Selection and Confirmation of 
Federal Judges Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 1 (1981). 
109 Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments (Part 1):  Hearings on Appointments to the 
Federal Judiciary Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 1 (1989). 
110 Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments (Part 1):  Hearings on Confirmations of 
Appointments to the Federal Judiciary Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 1 (1993). 
111 Senator Hatch argued that the Judiciary Committee could have met under Democratic control 
prior to the agreement of June 29, 1989.  See 147 CONG. REC. S10544 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) 
(statement of Sen. Hatch).  Given the highly contentious nature of judicial confirmation hearings, and 
especially those anticipated over several high-profile conservative nominees sent to the Senate by 
President Bush in May 2001, it is highly unlikely the Democrats would have been content to chair a 
Judiciary Committee with a majority-Republican membership. 
112 147 CONG. REC. S8034 (daily ed. July 23, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 Journal of Law & Politics [Vol.XXII:341  366 
to Kyl, “When [Daschle] made that statement, there were 76 vacancies, 29 
of which were categorized as „judicial emergencies.‟  Today there are 108 
vacancies, 40 of which are classified as „judicial emergencies.‟”113   
Senator Daschle was actually incorrect when he claimed only seventy-
six vacancies—there were eighty-five unfilled judicial positions  in the 
lower federal courts at the time he made his statement—but the more 
important point is that Senator Kyl‟s comparisons were not particularly 
revealing because they compared vacancies during different time periods 
of the two administrations.  March 2000, when Daschle commented on 
vacancies, was the beginning of the last year of Clinton‟s two-term 
presidency, whereas July 2001, when Kyl criticized the vacancies left over 
from Clinton‟s era, came at the very start of confirmations for Bush II‟s 
judges.  A more apt comparison for judicial vacancy numbers in July 
2001—Bush II‟s first year—would have been to July of Clinton‟s first 
year.  For example, during the entire month of July 1993 there were 117 
vacancies on the lower federal courts, a number which grew to 125 before 
the first four Clinton judges were confirmed on September 30, 2003.
114
  
Moreover, the 117 vacancies in July 1993 represented 14.4% of the 811 
positions in the federal judiciary, whereas the 108 vacancies in July 2001 
represented only 13% of the then-existing 830 judicial positions.
115
  Kyl‟s 
inapt comparison in July 2001 is an example of our second confirmation-
delay fallacy:  
 
2. Fallacy #2 (―Time Out‖) 
Comparing the number of judicial vacancies during a given time period 
in one administration to the number of vacancies in another administration 
during a non-analogous time period. 
 
Kyl‟s claim of “45 or so more” vacancies in July 2001 than at the end of 
the Clinton administration was also simply wrong.  In fact, there were 
seventy-three vacancies on Election Day 2000, and eighty-one vacancies 
by the official end of the Clinton presidency, January 20, 2001—a 
                                                 
113 Id. at S8034-35.  Daschle‟s original statement is found at 146 CONG. REC. S1255 (daily ed. Mar. 
8, 2000) (statement of Sen. Daschle). 
114 Democrats controlled the Senate during Clinton‟s first two years, so partisanship cannot be 
much blamed for any slowness in pace.  The larger point is that institutional issues inevitably lead to a 
growth in vacancies in the period immediately following a presidential election. 
115 The judiciary was expanded from 811 with the addition of nine positions on January 1, 1999, 
Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 133 (1999)), and another 10 
positions on January 1, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 
133 (2000)).   
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difference of twenty-seven vacancies from the 108 open judicial seats in 
July 2001. 
Some of the large number of vacancies at the beginning of the Clinton 
and Bush II administrations probably reflects the fact that many life-
tenured judges retire or take senior status after the White House switches 
parties due to a presidential election.
116
  For example, following twelve 
years of Republican presidency from 1981 to 1992, thirty-three judges left 
office in the one-year period beginning in October 1992.  Nineteen of those 
judges had been appointed by Democratic presidents.  Similarly, following 
eight years of the Clinton administration, forty-five judges left office in the 
year beginning in October 2000, of whom thirty-four had been appointed 
by Republicans.  Even if there is no political reason for the timing of these 
judicial retirements, the important point here is that due to institutional 
behavior in the Senate and the executive branch, many judicial vacancies 
will necessarily arise between the time that the Senate stops considering 
judicial nominees—no later than the summer of an election year—and the 
time when the Judiciary Committee begins its work on the judicial 
nominees of a new administration, generally no earlier than late summer or 
fall of the next year.   This observation gives us the first of our 
paradigmatic truisms (“relevancies”) about delay in the judicial 
confirmation process: 
 
3. Relevancy #1 (―Retirement Plan‖) 
Large numbers of vacancies arise during the time period between the 
summer of a presidential election year and the fall of the first year of a 
new administration, particularly when the parties of the incoming and 
outgoing presidents differ. 
 
In the weeks following Senator Kyl‟s and Senator Sessions‟s critical 
statements about the supposed slow pace of confirmation hearings under 
the Democratic Senate, the new chairman of the Judiciary Committee, 
                                                 
116 See Deborah J. Barrow & Gary Zuk, An Institutional Analysis of Turnover in the Lower Federal 
Courts, 1900–1987, 52 J. POL. 457, 464-72 (1990); David C. Nixon & J. David Haskin, Judicial 
Retirement Strategies:  The Judge‘s Role in Influencing Party Control of the Appellate Courts, 28 AM. 
POL. Q, 458, 484-85 (2000) (“To the extent that politics matters, it is primarily in the efforts of judges 
to delay retirement in the waning months of an opposing party president‟s administration, hoping for a 
change in White House control.”); James F. Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Calling It Quits:  Strategic 
Retirement on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893-1991, 48 POL. RES. Q. 573 (1995).  Then again, a 
recent provocative article suggests that retirement rates are more closely related to pension vesting than 
to any political considerations.  Albert Yoon, Pensions, Politics, and Judicial Tenure:  An Empirical 
Study of Federal Judges, 1869–2002, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 143 (2006). 
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Democrat Patrick Leahy of Vermont, began to answer his critics.
117
  
Unfortunately, Leahy‟s claims about delay were also off the mark.  After 
detailing the delays caused by the changeover in Senate control in June, 
Leahy continued: 
 
Now consider the progress we have made on judicial 
nominations in [the context of those delays].  There were 
no hearings on judicial nominations and no judges 
confirmed in the first half of the year [2001] with a 
Republican majority.  The first hearing I chaired on July 
11 was one more than all the hearings that had been held 
involving judges in the first half of the year.  The first 
judicial nomination who the Senate confirmed last Friday 
was more than all the judges confirmed in the first half of 
the year.
118
 
 
But this claim of superior pace in the judicial confirmation process was 
as out-of-context as the Kyl and Sessions comments of only a few days 
before and was, indeed, just a version of the Dog Days fallacy, which 
reflects the fact that little happens in the process until the first September 
of a new presidency.  As explained above, the failure of the Republican-led 
Judiciary Committee to hold hearings during the first half of 2001 was 
dictated not by any unusual procrastination by Republican Committee 
Chairman Hatch, but rather by the regular timing cycle of judicial 
nominations that follow a presidential election in which the White House 
changes hands. 
Leahy also compared the number of appellate judges confirmed during 
the first year of the Bush I administration (five) and the number confirmed 
during the first year of Clinton‟s presidency (three) with the single 
appellate judge that the current Senate had just confirmed, and observed 
that his committee had already held hearings for two additional Court of 
Appeals nominees.
119
  However, Leahy failed to note that the confirmed 
judge was Roger Gregory, originally a Clinton nominee and recess 
                                                 
117 The tenor of the July 2001 debate over judicial appointments is well-illustrated by the following 
excerpt from Senator Leahy:  “In spite of the progress we have been making during the few weeks 
since the Senate was allowed to reorganize . . . on Monday our Republican colleagues took to the 
Senate floor to change the tone of Senate debate on nominations into a bitterly partisan one.  That was 
most unfortunate.”  147 CONG. REC. S8339 (daily ed. July 27, 2001). 
118 147 CONG. REC. S8340 (daily ed. July 27, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).  See also 147 
CONG. REC. S10681 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 2001) (statement of Sen. Reid) (to same effect).  
119 147 CONG. REC. S8340 (daily ed. July 27, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).   
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appointment to the Fourth Circuit, who was only renominated by Bush II 
as a gesture of bipartisan cooperation at the time of an evenly-divided 
Senate.
120
   
Leahy also claimed that his Judiciary Committee‟s performance thus far 
in 2001 compared favorably to the appellate confirmations of 1996, when, 
according to Leahy, a Republican-led Senate failed to confirm even one of 
Clinton‟s Court of Appeals nominees.121  While the Senate‟s record of 
obstruction in 1996 was indeed extraordinary, as discussed further below, 
that year is not a good benchmark for comparisons with the first half of 
2001.  Leahy‟s argument is a more particularized version of the Time Out 
fallacy, in which one compares the number of judicial vacancies during a 
given period of time in one administration to the number of vacancies in 
another administration during a non-analogous time period.  The years in 
which presidential elections take place, such as 1988, 1992, 1996, and 
2000, have at least in recent history been markedly slower than other years 
for judicial confirmations.
122
  The obvious reason for this relative inaction 
is that Senators in opposition to the sitting president wish to hold judicial 
seats open on the chance that a president of their party will be able to fill 
them in a new administration.
123
  Thus the second confirmation-delay 
relevancy: 
 
4. Relevancy #2 (―Four Corners‖) 
Within a president‘s four-year term, the year leading up to the next 
presidential election (the fourth year) is markedly slower than other years 
for judicial confirmations. 
 
As discussed above, the first year following a presidential election 
typically has different institutional problems that lead to delay in 
confirmations, but such years are not easily comparable to years in which a 
presidential election takes place. 
                                                 
120 See supra note 104. 
121 147 CONG. REC. S8340 (daily ed. July 27, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy).  Leahy was wrong 
about this.  A. Wallace Tashima and Sidney R. Thomas were both confirmed to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on January 2, 1996.  142 CONG. REC. S19344 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 1996). 
122 See Goldman, Unpicking, supra note 15, at 710 (“It is true that Congresses that include a 
presidential election year . . . have a lower proportion of confirmations than Congresses that do not.”). 
123 See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S7452 (daily ed. July 29, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (quoting 
Prof. Kent Markus during the confirmations in 1996) (“The fact was, a decision had been made to hold 
the vacancies and see who won the presidential election.  With a Bush win, all those seats could go to 
Bush rather than Clinton nominees.”). 
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Leahy was on firmer ground in discussing Bush II‟s nominations to 
positions designated as “judicial emergencies” by the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts.
124
  Leahy was correct in his claim that the 
president had not yet nominated a single judge to fill one of the twenty-
three judicial emergency positions in the District Courts.
125
  By July 27, 
2001, Bush II had nominated twenty-nine judges, but twenty had been to 
the Courts of Appeals, and none of the nine District Court nominees were 
for emergency positions.
126
  While twelve of the twenty appellate 
nominations were for judicial emergencies, Leahy was right in noting that 
“many of these emergency vacancies became emergency vacancies and 
were perpetuated as emergency vacancies by the Republican majority‟s 
refusal to act on President Clinton‟s nomination[s] over the last 6 years.”127  
Indeed, fifteen of the eighteen Court of Appeals judicial emergency 
positions in July 2001 had lingered unfilled from at least one year and in 
some cases up to eight years during the Clinton administration.
128
  This is 
of course a product of the Four Corners relevancy. 
The following week, on August 2, 2001, Chairman Leahy and the 
Ranking Minority member of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Orrin 
Hatch, exchanged barbs regarding the number of hearings held and the 
number of judges confirmed during the month of July 2001, as compared 
                                                 
124 For the Judicial Conference definition of “judicial emergency” positions, see Revised Definition 
for Judicial Emergencies, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/080801/emergencies.htm. 
125 147 CONG. REC. S8340 (July 27, 2001).  There were actually twenty-two District Court judicial 
emergencies. See http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/070201/emergencies2.htm (data for July 2, 2001). 
126 The eighteen judicial emergencies for the Courts of Appeals were for the Second, Third, Fourth 
(four), Fifth (three), Sixth (four), Eighth, Ninth (three), and Eleventh Circuits.  See id.  These figures 
did not reflect that Judge Gregory had been confirmed to the 4th Circuit on July 20, 2001.  147 CONG. 
REC. S8340 (daily ed. July 27, 2001)(statement of Sen. Leahy).     
127 Id. at S8340-41. 
128 See also 147 CONG. REC. S8341 (daily ed. July 27, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“I remind 
my colleagues of their failure to grant a hearing or Committee or Senate consideration to the following:  
Robert Cindrich to the Third Circuit; Judge James A. Beaty, Jr. and Judge James A. Wynn, Jr. to the 
Fourth Circuit; Jorge Rangel, Enrique Moreno and H. Alston Johnson to the Fifth Circuit; Judge 
Helene White, Kathleen McCree-Lewis and Kent Marcus to the Sixth Circuit; Bonnie Campbell to the 
Eighth Circuit; James Duffy and Barry Goode to the Ninth Circuit.  Those were 12 Court [sic] of 
Appeals nominees to 10 vacancies who could have gone a long way toward reducing the level of 
judicial emergencies around the country.”).  On several occasions, Senator Leahy remarked on the 
irony of the Republican rush to fill judicial positions that had been held over from the Clinton 
presidency.  See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S10684 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy):  
 
It is a little bit like the young person who is before the court.  He is there for 
murdering his parents and he says, Your Honor, you have to have mercy on me.  
I am an orphan.  Well, this is the same thing.  Republicans spent 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
years creating enormous judicial vacancies and then they come in and say we 
have to fill these judicial vacancies. 
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to the months of July during each of the previous six years.
129
  These types 
of comparisons make no sense at all.  During the first year of a new 
presidential administration very little, if anything, happens with regard to 
judicial nominations by the end of July.
130
  There is really no basis for 
comparing committee action during the first year of a new presidency to 
activity during other years, when more nominations have been made and 
time has passed to allow committee investigation and action.   
Senator Hatch‟s August 2 claims also illustrate the futility of comparing 
activity from the first year of a presidency to years other than the first year 
in that or any other presidency.  Employing this Time Out fallacy, Hatch 
argued that the number of judges confirmed by the Democratic-majority 
Senate in July 2001—four—did not match up favorably to the numbers 
confirmed in July months between 1995 and 2000, when Republicans 
controlled the Senate—eleven, sixteen, three, six, four, and five, 
respectively.
131
  The problem with Hatch‟s argument is that these numbers 
ignore the length of time that the Judiciary Committee would have had to 
consider nominees by July of a given year.  For example, because the 
White House changed hands in 2001, no nominations were made that year 
until early May, giving the Senate little time to consider them by July.  In 
contrast, when the Senate confirmed sixteen judges in July 1996, all but 
one of those judges had been nominated by May of that year.  In fact, nine 
of the sixteen had been nominated the year before.  Likewise, the three 
judges confirmed in July 1997 had all been pending as nominees for over a 
year.  And only one of the six judges confirmed in July 1998 had been 
nominated as late as May of that year.
132
   
Senator Leahy‟s comparison between the two Judiciary Committee 
nomination hearings of July 2001 with the number of nomination hearings 
held each month during Republican control of the Senate, from 1995 to 
2000, also suffers from the Time Out fallacy, in that it compares statistics 
from non-analogous time periods of separate administrations.
133
  The dates 
                                                 
129 See 147 CONG. REC. S8691-92 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2001) (statements of Sens. Leahy and Hatch). 
130 See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text. 
131 147 CONG. REC. S8692 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hatch).  These numbers are 
mostly correct.  Although no judges were confirmed in July 1995, nine judges were confirmed on June 
30 of that year.   
132 Federal Judicial Center, supra note 92. 
133 Senator Leahy argued that:  
 
During the more than 6 years in which the Senate Republican majority scheduled 
confirmation hearings, there were 34 months with no hearing at all, 30 months 
with only one hearing and only 12 times in almost six and one-half years did the 
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of Judiciary Committee hearings depend on myriad factors that affect the 
scheduling of all Senate floor and committee actions; the timing of the 
hearings does not depend on whether it is July.
134
  Moreover, the timing 
and number of hearings do not speak to the ultimate question of the 
number of judges confirmed by the full Senate.  Thus a particular version 
of the Time Out fallacy, often invoked by Senator Leahy: 
 
5. Fallacy #3 (―Hearing Test‖) 
Making arguments based solely on the number of Judiciary Committee 
hearings held, or hearings held during any particular time period, or the 
number of nominees appearing at each hearing. 
 
Because of the Senate‟s August recess and the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, arguments over the pace of judicial confirmations 
subsided for a time.
135
  They resumed in October 2001, however, as 
Republicans moved to bring the pace of judicial nominations back into 
national focus.  Republican senators did so by working to block or slow 
down the appropriations process in order to get agreements with the 
Democratic majority on the proper pace of judicial confirmation 
hearings.
136
  Senator Leahy took to the floor to answer the challenges.  
Leahy‟s main argument was that the pace of judicial confirmations in the 
107
th
 Congress compared favorably to the pace of confirmations during the 
                                                                                                                
Judiciary Committee hold as many as two hearings involving judicial 
nominations in a month. 
 
147 CONG. REC. S8691-92 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
134 Cf. 147 CONG. REC. S10544 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“I disagree 
with the whole idea that such a statistic [the number of months of his chairmanship of the Judiciary 
Committee during the Clinton administration with no hearings] could be relevant to any analysis of 
whether the Senate is performing its constitutional advice and consent function sufficiently.”); see also 
Stephan B. Burbank, Politics, Privilege & Power, 86 JUDICATURE 24, 27 (“An apparently 
unprecedented number of nominees never made it to a Judiciary Committee hearing and/or to the floor 
during the Clinton presidency, however, with the result that statistics based on those who were the 
subject of such hearings, or of a vote in the full Senate, are misleading if not meaningless.”). 
135 See Paul Kane, Key Agency Nominees Will Receive Rapid Senate Action; Agreement Does Not 
Include Judicial Candidates, ROLL CALL, September 17, 2001 (“Republican Policy Committee 
Chairman Larry Craig (R-Idaho) agreed that the goodwill on agency nominations is „different‟ from 
lifetime positions on the federal bench, but predicted that judicial fights will not reach anywhere near 
the level of partisanship that had been building over the past few months.”). 
136 See Paul Kane, Lott‘s Push for Judges Imperils Partisan Truce, ROLL CALL, October 4, 2001 
(“Revisiting a pre-September 11 strategy, Senate Republicans plan to block and delay the 
appropriations process until they get solid guarantees that the Democratic majority will begin to 
confirm more judicial nominees . . . .  The move appears to have at least the tacit blessing of the White 
House.”); Donald Lambro, “GOP ‗Hardball‘ Ploy Aims to Fill Benches; Action Demanded on Bush 
Nominees,” WASH. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2001, at A10. 
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first years of the Bush I and Clinton presidencies.  Leahy noted that during 
the first year of the Bush I administration, 1989, “the fourth Court of 
Appeals nominee [of five total] was not confirmed until November 8,” and 
that “the Senate never confirmed a fourth Court of Appeals nominee” 
during Clinton‟s first year, 1993.137  In contrast, in 2001 the Senate was 
confirming its fourth appellate nominee on October 4, and would confirm a 
fifth by the year‟s end.138 
These assertions were correct but did not tell the full story.  What most 
concerned Republicans was not the absolute number of appellate judges 
confirmed, but rather the number of appellate judges nominated but not yet 
confirmed.  True, by mid-October 2001 four Court of Appeals judges had 
been confirmed, but another twenty-one of Bush II‟s appellate nominees 
had not.
139
  In contrast, only one of Clinton‟s appellate nominees had not 
been confirmed by mid-October 1993, and all five of Bush I‟s nominees 
that had been named by mid-October 1989 were confirmed that year.
140
 
In responding to Senator Leahy‟s remarks, on October 11, 1989 Senator 
Hatch made this point about the number of judges that had been nominated 
by Bush II but not yet confirmed.  He argued that “[m]ost of the statistics 
show that the judges who were nominated in the first year of a President, 
up to August 1st, basically went through.”141  Minority Leader Trent Lott 
referred explicitly to the Bush II appellate court nominees: 
 
But here is what really does concern me.  Of the judges 
whose names were submitted as far back as May and June, 
of that group of circuit judges, which included 19 of them, 
and including Judge Gregory, who clearly is a Democratic 
nominee, only 3 have been confirmed.  One more has been 
reported.  And there has been 1 hearing, leaving 14 of the 
19 circuit judges‟ names submitted in May or early June.142 
                                                 
137 147 CONG. REC. S10539 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001). 
138 Id. 
139 Recall that Bush II nominated far more Court of Appeals judges, and far more quickly, than had 
previous administrations.  See 147 CONG. REC. S10543 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch) (“There are currently twenty-one of President Bush‟s circuit court nominees pending in 
committee and who will be left at the end of his first year if the committee does not act soon.”).  See 
supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
140 Three other appellate judges were named by Bush I following mid-October 1989, and all were 
confirmed by early March 1990. 
141 147 CONG. REC. S10541 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001).   
142 Id. at S10542.  Following up on earlier comments, Senator Hatch elaborated: 
 
President Clinton nominated 32 judges before October 31, 1993, his first year in 
office.  Twenty-eight were confirmed that year.  That‟s an 88 percent 
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This was really the rub with respect to judicial nominations during Bush 
II‟s first year—how should the Senate have reacted to such an 
unprecedented flood of nominations, in particular the flood of Court of 
Appeals nominations?
143
  This issue is important because the nominations 
process, at least in this respect, may have been permanently changed from 
the slower nominations pace of presidents before Bush II.  If future 
presidents send early nominations to the Senate we will likely again see 
that the current system, particularly if the Senate insists on ABA review of 
the nominations before consideration in the Judiciary Committee,
144
 does 
not work particularly well to provide speedy confirmations. 
 
6. Relevancy #3 (―Future Shock‖) 
If a large number of lower-court judicial nominations are made early in 
the first term of future administrations, we should not expect to see speedy 
confirmations without changes in the current system of Senate review. 
 
Other arguments made during the fall of 2001 about the statistics of 
judicial confirmation rates were flawed.  Senator Hatch persisted in 
comparing the then-current vacancy rate in the federal judiciary, 108 of 
830 (13.0%), with vacancy rates at the end of the 104
th
, 105
th
, and 106
th
 
Congresses, which were 7.7%, 5.9%, and 7.9%, respectively.
145
  This is an 
example of the Time Out fallacy—comparing statistics from non-
                                                                                                                
confirmation rate.  It‟s similar to the confirmation rate during the first year of 
President G.H.W. Bush‟s presidency— 89 percent—and compares to President 
Reagan‟s 100 percent rate of confirmation for nominees sent to the Senate before 
October 31, 1981.  Compare these rates to where we are under President Bush 
and Chairman Leahy.  President Bush has nominated 59 judicial nominees.  Only 
eight have been confirmed—including the two the Senate confirmed tonight.  
That‟s a rate of 13.5 percent. 
 
Id. at S10544.  Of course, the Democrats still had some time left in 2001.  The Senate ended up 
confirming twenty-eight lower-court judges by the end of the year. 
143 On the great number of early Bush II nominations, see 147 CONG. REC. S10682 (daily ed. Oct. 
15, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“It is important to point out that, probably more than any of the last 
four Presidents, [Bush II] has acted with alacrity to fill vacancies.”).  See also 148 CONG. REC. S1697 
(daily ed. Mar. 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Smith):  
 
It is unfair to compare the first years of the second Bush administration and the 
Clinton administration by looking only at the mere number of nominees 
confirmed.  This approach fails to take into account the fact that President Bush 
chose to nominate 24 more circuit court nominees than President Clinton did.  
We can get lost in the numbers, and I don‟t want to go through it. 
 
144 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
145 See also 147 CONG. REC. S10679 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
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analogous time periods of separate administrations.  More apt might have 
been a comparison to mid-October vacancies during the Reagan, Bush I, 
and Clinton presidencies: 115 of 642 (17.9%), 57 of 731 (7.8%), and 122 
of 811 (11.7%), respectively.  Another favorite Hatch argument was 
comparing the total number of judges confirmed under Presidents Reagan 
and Clinton:   
 
The bottom line of the [Hatch] Chairmanship is that the 
Senate confirmed essentially the same number of judges 
for President Clinton as it did for President Reagan—only 
5 fewer.  This proves the Republicans were fair—
especially because it was a six-year Republican controlled 
Senate that confirmed 382 Reagan nominees, and a six-
year Republican controlled Senate that confirmed 377 
Clinton nominees.
146
 
 
When other facts are considered, Hatch‟s simple numerical comparison 
does not prove that the Republican Senate was fair to Clinton.  For 
example, other commentators have ably shown ways in which levels of 
obstruction have grown over the last twenty-five years, including during 
Senator Hatch‟s time as Chair of the Judiciary Committee.147  Moreover, 
when Reagan began his presidency in 1981, there were 642 lower-court 
judicial positions in total, a number that rose to 731 at the end of his 
second term, for an average of 695 positions during his time in office.
148
  
For Clinton, the number went from 811 to 830, an average of 815 
positions.  Thus, Reagan‟s 382 confirmations represented 55.0% of the 
judiciary, as compared to 46.3% for Clinton.  Filling a comparable 
percentage of positions would have given Clinton 448 nominations.   
 
                                                 
146 147 CONG. REC. S10544 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001). 
147 A particularly excellent analysis of the increasing level of obstruction is presented by Professor 
Sheldon Goldman in Unpicking, supra note 15, and Assessing the Senate Judicial Confirmation 
Process:  The Index of Obstruction and Delay, supra note 15.  Also note that 123 of 377 of the judges 
confirmed during the Clinton administration—nearly two thirds— were confirmed during the first two 
years, when Democrats controlled the Senate. 
148 From the start of Reagan‟s first term, there were 642 lower-court judicial positions until April 
1982, when the twelve Federal Circuit judges were added.  Act of April 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 25.  That 
number remained constant until July 1984, when the total number of positions rose to 731.  Act of July 
10, 1984, 98 Stat. 333.  President Clinton‟s presidency began with 811 judicial positions.  Judicial 
appropriation acts added nine district court judges for 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 133 (1999)), and another ten positions for 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
553, 114 Stat. 2762 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 133 (2000)).   
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7. Fallacy #4 (―Absolute Value‖) 
Asserting that the total number of judges confirmed during a presidency 
is a true measure of Judiciary Committee fairness and effectiveness. 
 
As the Republicans continued to stall appropriations bills through mid-
October 2001 in order to force Democrats to move faster on judicial 
nominations, many senators from both sides of the aisle made speeches on 
the judicial confirmation process.  The senators‟ arguments generally 
echoed those made by Senators Leahy and Hatch, the current and former 
chair of the Judiciary Committee and thus the two leaders most closely 
associated with nominations.   
A few new statistics were tossed into the mix.  A common Republican 
claim, made in one instance by Senator George Allen of Virginia on 
October 16, 2001, was that only eight Bush II judges had been confirmed 
thus far—“nowhere near the 28 judges confirmed during Clinton‟s first 
year, nor the 16 confirmed during Bush I‟s first year.”149  As with some of 
the other arguments discussed above, this argument fails to take into 
account the cycles of a given year‟s confirmations, evidencing the Dog 
Days and Time Out fallacies.  Of the twenty-seven first-year Clinton 
appointees, only four were approved prior to October 20, 1993.  The four 
Bush I judges confirmed before October 25, 1989, were all renominations 
of Reagan appointees that had not gone through.  All eleven of Bush I‟s 
new nominees were confirmed between late October and the end of the 
year.  President Reagan had an unusually high number of judges—
twelve—confirmed prior to October of his first year in office,150 but the 
other twenty-eight of his first-year judicial appointees were confirmed after 
October 25, 1981.  The fair test for end-of-the-year statistical comparisons 
of the type Senator Allen made in October 2001 would be the end of the 
year.
151
  As it turns out, as discussed below, Leahy was able to get twenty-
eight nominees confirmed by the end of 2001.
152
 
                                                 
149 147 CONG. REC. S10761 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2001).  In fact, only fifteen lower-court judges were 
confirmed in 1989, Bush I‟s first year in office.  There were twenty-seven lower-court confirmations 
during Clinton‟s first year; the Supreme Court confirmation of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on August 
3, 1993, brought the total number of judges to twenty-eight. 
150 Ten of those were confirmed in September. 
151 Senator Reid picked up on the first-year timing issue—that most first-year nominations are not 
approved until late in the year—and made good arguments on that basis.  See 147 CONG. REC. S10832-
33 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 2001).  He also added a few of the specious Leahy arguments, detailed above, for 
good measure.  Id.   
152 Given the Senate reorganization, the September 11 terrorist attacks, and the anthrax attacks on 
Senator Daschle‟s and Leahy‟s offices in November, it was a solid achievement to exceed in 2001 the 
number of judges confirmed in 1993 for Clinton by a Democrat-majority Senate, as far as this type of 
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Allen also claimed that the 108 vacancies of mid-October 2001 (thirteen 
percent of the judiciary) were “the highest [number] in modern history, 
except for the extraordinary event in December of 1990 when Congress 
created 85 [sic] new positions and, therefore, there were 85 vacancies all at 
once.”153  However, there were 108 or more vacancies (peaking at 124 of 
642, or 19.3% of the judiciary) for the entire period between March 14 and 
November 18, 1981, when Republicans controlled the White House and 
the Senate.  When seventy-seven new positions were added to the judiciary 
on July 10, 1984, the number of vacancies hit 124 and did not fall below 
108 until over a year later, on July 22, 1984.  Congress did add eighty 
positions in December 1990, raising vacancies to 113, but the maximum 
vacancies still reached 138 of 811 (17%) before eventually falling below 
108 in April of 1992, nearly a year and a half later.  Vacancies exceeded 
108 during the Clinton administration from April 2, 1993, to November 24, 
1993, peaking at 123 before nineteen judges were confirmed on November 
22 and November 24, with Democrats controlling the Senate.  Vacancies 
again hit and exceeded 108 from December 1993 to March 1994.  
As the Democrats confirmed more judges in the days following October 
15, 2001,
154
 Senate Republicans perhaps realized that they had made an 
error in arguing, as Senator Allen had, that President Bush would not get 
an identical number of lower-court nominees confirmed—twenty-seven—
as did President Clinton in his first year.  Because Bush II had nominated 
many more judges in his first year than previous presidents, it was not the 
absolute number of judges confirmed that really mattered to Republicans, 
but rather the percentage of judges—and particularly appellate judges—
who received confirmation.  For example, in late October 2001 Arlen 
Specter put a resolution before the Senate urging the body to confirm 
before the end of that year all judges who had been nominated by President 
                                                                                                                
comparison goes.  See Noelle Straub, Judicial Gridlock in Senate:  Same Story, Different Setting, THE 
HILL, Feb. 27, 2001, at 1:   
 
Michael Gerhardt, law professor at the College of William and Mary and author 
of The Federal Appointments Process, noted that the Senate Judiciary 
Committee faced an unprecedented situation in the past year.  Democrats 
suddenly took control of the Senate in June and Vermont‟s Patrick Leahy (D) 
replaced Utah‟s Orrin Hatch (R) as chairman, and the panel had to expedite 
antiterrorism legislation after Sept. 11. 
 
153 147 CONG. REC. S10761 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2001).  Congress actually added eighty positions, 
not eighty-five.   
154 Four District Court judges were confirmed on October 23, 2001.  See 147 CONG. REC. S10868-
71 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2001). 
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Bush before the start of the Senate‟s August recess.155  Specter argued that 
this expedited confirmation timeline would be appropriate because 100% 
of Reagan‟s and Bush I‟s pre-recess judges had been confirmed by the end 
of their first years in office, and 93% of Clinton‟s had been confirmed in 
his first year.
156
  Specter‟s proposed resolution concluded: 
 
It is the sense of the Senate that (1) prior to the end of the 
first session of the 107th Congress, the Committee on the 
Judiciary shall hold hearings on, and the Committee on the 
Judiciary and the full Senate shall have votes on, at a 
minimum, the judicial nominations sent to the Senate by 
the President prior to August 4, 2001, and (2) the standard 
for approving pre-August recess judicial nominations for 
past administrations should be the standard for this and 
future administrations regardless of political party.
157
 
 
It is the second clause in the Specter resolution that may prove 
interesting to future Congresses.  As discussed above,
158
 given the intense 
partisanship that has developed over lower-court judicial positions, 
particular those to the Courts of Appeals,
159
 first-year presidents may in the 
future seek confirmation of more early judicial nominees than was the 
practice prior to Bush II.  If a number of those early nominations are to the 
appellate courts, and are perceived by an opposition-led Senate to be 
immoderate in political or judicial ideology, it is hard to imagine a Senate 
considering and confirming the nominees prior to the end-of-year recess.  
This would be a particularly interesting issue if a Democrat were to win the 
                                                 
155 147 CONG. REC. S10927 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2001).  The resolution was in the form of an 
amendment to an appropriations bill, and was immediately ruled non-germane on a point of order from 
Senator Reid.  Id. at S10928.  See also 147 CONG. REC. S12121 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 2001) (statement of 
Sen. Hatch) (focusing on unconfirmed appellate nominees).  Bush II had nominated forty-four judges 
before the August recess of 2001; half of the nominees were to the Courts of Appeals. 
156 Id. at S10927. 
157 Id.  
158 See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text (discussing the “Future Shock” relevancy). 
159 Regarding the importance of the lower courts, see 147 CONG. REC. S13666 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 
2001) (statement of Sen. Kennedy):  
 
Lifetime appointments are at stake.  The need for careful review is important not 
just for Supreme Court nominees but for nominees to the lower Federal courts as 
well.  These courts hold immense power.  Many important legal issues in this 
country are decided at the Court of Appeals level, since the Supreme Court 
decides fewer than 100 cases per year. 
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presidency in 2008 and make early nominations to a Republican Senate 
with a Judiciary Committee headed by Senator Specter.
160
 
The first session of the 107
th
 Congress ended in December 2001 with, if 
anything, starker divisions between Republicans and Democrats over 
judicial nominations compared with earlier months in the year.  The 
arguments made by both parties remained essentially the same, and 
although the Democrats confirmed more lower-court judges for Bush II in 
2001 than they did for Clinton in 1993, almost all of the nominees regarded 
as “controversial” by the Democrats were left without hearings or votes, 
awaiting the second session of the 107
th
 Congress, which began in January 
2002. 
 
B. 107th Congress, 2nd Session (2002) 
Bush II sent twenty-four nominations, all for District Court positions, to 
the Senate in January 2002,
161
 and partisan skirmishing over judicial 
confirmations began in earnest in the Second Session of the 107
th
 
Congress.  Leading the way were Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, and Orrin Hatch, the Committee‟s Ranking 
Minority Member.  And once again much of the rhetoric focused on 
statistics regarding delay. 
Leahy reported on the status of judicial nominations on January 25, 
2002.  He began with typical arguments containing versions of the Dog 
Days,
162
 Time Out,
163
 Hearing Test,
164
 and Absolute Value
165
 fallacies.  But 
Leahy also made some more relevant arguments.  He noted that fifty of 
                                                 
160 See also 148 CONG. REC. S1233, S1235 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2002) (statement of Sen. Specter):  
  
I think we ought to declare a truce and sign an armistice agreement that we are 
not going to have a repetition of what happened when we had a Democrat in the 
White House and Republicans in control of the Judiciary Committee . . . .  We 
ought to declare this truce and ought to sign this armistice so we take partisan 
politics out of the confirmation process of Federal judges. 
 
161 148 CONG. REC. S49 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2002).  None by Reagan in January; eleven by Bush I; 
nine by Clinton. 
162 See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S118 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2002) (“Last session we had less than 6 
months.”). 
163 See, e.g., id. (“By contrast, when my friends on the other side of the aisle took charge of the 
Senate in January 1995, until the majority shifted last summer, judicial vacancies rose from 65 to more 
than 100, an increase of almost 60 percent.”). 
164 See, e.g., id. at S119. 
165 See, e.g., id. at S118 (“In just 5 months we went on to confirm 28 additional judges, as I have 
said, more than five times the number the White House predicted we would confirm.  Think of that, 
Mr. President—five times what the White House was telling the American people we would 
confirm.”). 
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Clinton‟s lower-court nominees received neither a hearing nor committee 
vote when the Republicans controlled the Senate from 1995 to 2000, and 
even some nominations that led to confirmations had been delayed by 
years.
166
   
Leahy also gave two plausible arguments for why unilateral action by 
the Bush II administration had caused delays in the 107
th
 Congress‟s 
confirmation process.  First, the administration ended the practice of 
having the American Bar Association review candidates for federal 
judgeship prior to their nominations.  ABA review started with the 
Eisenhower administration and continued uninterrupted for nearly fifty 
years through the Clinton administration, but a rising chorus of 
conservative critics urged the Bush II administration to drop the practice.
167
  
The Democrat-led Senate Judiciary Committee, however, decided to keep 
the ABA involved, and asked for reviews post-nomination.  The time 
needed for the ABA to complete the reviews generally delayed 
consideration of the candidates by the Senate for six to eight weeks.
168
 
Second, Leahy accused the Bush II administration of “disregarding . . . 
the longstanding practice that encouraged consultation with home-state 
senators, both Republicans and Democrats.”169  Leahy was perhaps 
overstating the “longstanding” influence that opposition senators have had 
over judicial nominations in their states, however.  While it was apparently 
the practice of the Republican-led Judiciary Committee during the Clinton 
administration to allow a single withheld “blue slip” from a home-state 
senator to prevent consideration of a nominee, even from a senator not of 
the president‟s party, commentators have reported that the practice was not 
so strictly implemented in prior Congresses.
170
 
 
 
                                                 
166 Id. at S119.  Sheldon Goldman puts the number of Clinton nominees without hearings at 
seventy-six, and counts a total of one hundred lower-court Clinton nominees who were not confirmed 
during Republican control of the Senate.  Goldman, Assessing, supra note 15, at 252-53.  Professor 
Goldman‟s numbers treat “renominations” in subsequent Congresses as separate nominations.  See 
infra note 195. 
167 Lewis & Johnston, supra note 63.  Perhaps ironically, the ABA Standing Committee on the 
Federal Judiciary had been criticized in earlier times as favoring traditionally successful older white 
males as judicial candidates.  See Arthur J. Paone & Robert Ira Reis, Effective Enforcement of Federal 
Nondiscrimination Provisions in the Hiring of Lawyers, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 615, 616 n.5 (1967) (noting 
that the Committee “usually recommends only the „Wall Street‟ type lawyer for Federal judgeships”); 
Elliot E. Slotnick, The ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary:  A Contemporary Assessment—
Part 2, 66 JUDICATURE 385 (1982). 
168 148 CONG. REC. S119 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
169 Id. 
170 See Denning, Blue Slip, supra note 15, at 76-87. 
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1. Relevancy #4 (―Kind of Blue‖) 
The effect given by the Senate Judiciary Committee chairman to the 
withholding of a ―blue slip‖ by one or both home-state senators can 
determine the success or failure of any particular lower-court judicial 
nominee. 
 
In his opening remarks during the Senate debate on January 25, 2002, 
Senator Hatch began with the Absolute Value fallacy
171
 and added the 
Time Out fallacy,
172
 but he also brought up several important issues.  First, 
he argued that more nominees were “left hanging” without a vote (fifty-
four) at the end of the Bush I presidency, when Democrats controlled the 
Senate, than were pending without a vote (forty-one) at the end of the 
Clinton presidency, when Republicans controlled the Senate.
173
  Second, 
Hatch brought up the increasingly important point, first raised the previous 
year, that twenty-three of Bush II‟s twenty-nine nominees to the Courts of 
Appeals had yet to be confirmed.
174
  He also announced a goal of the 
confirmation of at least one hundred judges in 2002, the number confirmed 
in 1994, during Clinton‟s second year in office.175   
Senator Hatch‟s statistic of nominees “left hanging” without a vote is 
one possible measure of Senate obstruction of a president‟s judicial 
nominees.  However, Hatch‟s statistic leaves out a large category of 
nominees who also do not receive Senate votes—those whose names are 
withdrawn during the course of the administration and are thus no longer 
pending at the end of a presidency.  A better measure of obstruction would 
also take into account these withdrawn judges.  For example, Reagan 
                                                 
171 148 CONG. REC. S117, S121 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2002) (“[T]he overall record makes clear that we 
were fair.”). 
172 Id. at S124-25.  Hatch quoted approvingly from Chief Justice Rehnquist‟s 2001 year-end report 
on the federal judiciary, comparing the eighty-two vacancies on the federal courts at the beginning of 
1998 with the ninety-nine vacancies at the beginning of 2002.  Of course, the Clinton administration 
had been appointing judges for five years by 1998, and had overcome some of the delays inherent in 
the first year of an administration.  A fairer comparison for January 2002 might have been the 
beginning of the second year for Clinton, January 1994 (112 vacancies), or even January 1982 (ninety-
four vacancies), the beginning of the second year of the Reagan Administration.  Bush I only faced 
sixty vacancies at the start of his second year, 1990, but he had begun his presidential term with a 
remarkably low thirty-nine vacancies at the start of 1989. 
173 Id. at S121.  Hatch further argued that, given that some of the nominations in each 
administration were made too late to be acted upon by the Senate, the effective numbers left pending 
were forty-eight for Bush I and thirty-two for Clinton. 
174 Id. at S125.  See also 148 CONG. REC. S117, S127 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. 
Nickles) (“The percentage of district court judges has been a good percentage for the number who were 
nominated through the summer . . . .  On circuit court judges, the record is not quite so good.  We have 
confirmed six.  President Bush has nominated 29.”). 
175 Id. at S124.   
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appointed 373 lower-court judges in his eight years in office; only twenty-
six of his nominees were not voted on in the Senate.
176
  Bush I appointed 
184, and did not get votes on fifty-three others.
177
  Clinton appointed 365 
lower-court judges and did not receive votes on sixty-nine others.
178
 
On February 4, 2002, Leahy revisited claims that suffered from the Dog 
Days and Time Out fallacies.
179
  He also spelled out a broader role for the 
Senate in advising on potential nominees.
180
  Leahy chose to emphasize 
statistics for trial court nominees, tacit evidence that he recognized that 
appellate nominees would be the battleground during the upcoming year.
181
   
Hatch‟s rejoinder to Leahy‟s speech was also a re-airing of past claims, 
with the Absolute Value,
182
 Dog Days,
183
 and Time Out
184
 fallacies given 
prominence.  Hatch again focused on delays in circuit court nominations.  
He also defended the Bush II administration‟s work with home-state 
senators in the nomination process
185
 and noted that some of the Clinton 
nominees that had been held up for long periods of time lacked home-state 
senatorial support.
186
 
Both Leahy and Hatch returned to their basic judicial-confirmation 
“stump speeches” on February 11.187  However, Hatch‟s speech of March 
                                                 
176 At some point in the process, nominations are made too late in the election cycle to be acted 
upon by the Senate.  Using a date of July 1 as a cutoff does not change the numbers very much.  Only 
one of the failed Reagan nominations was made after July 1, 1988.  Six additional Reagan nominees 
were eventually confirmed after renomination during the Bush I administration.  See supra note 93. 
177 Ten of the failed Bush I nominations were made after July 1, 1992. 
178 Thirteen of the failed Clinton nominations were made after July 1, 2000. 
179 148 CONG. REC. S276- (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2002).  Leahy inserted a similar speech the next day.  
See 148 CONG. REC. S319-20 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2002). 
180 148 CONG. REC. S278 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2002) (“The most progress can be made most quickly if 
the White House would begin working with home-State Senators to identify fair-minded, 
nonideological, consensus nominees to fill these court vacancies.”).   
181 Id. (“In the last 5 months of last year, the Senate confirmed a higher percentage of the 
President‟s trial court nominees, 22 out of 36, than a Republican majority had confirmed in the first 
session of either of the last two Congresses with a Democratic President.”). 
182 148 CONG. REC. S341 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2002). 
183 Id. at S341. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 148 CONG. REC. S582-83 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 2002).  Leahy repeated his basic claims on 
February 15,  February 26, and March 12.  See 148 CONG. REC. S1738 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002); 148 
CONG. REC. S1138 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S894 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 2002).  
Different versions of the basic Leahy speech can also be found at 148 CONG. REC. S3338-40 (daily ed. 
Apr. 25, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S3143 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S2932-33 (daily ed. 
Apr. 18, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S2758 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S2661-62 (daily ed. 
Apr. 15, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S2200 (Mar. 21, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S1998 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 
2002).  Hatch was less repetitive, but occasionally restated his basic points.  See 148 CONG. REC. 
S7456 (daily ed. July 29, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S7019 (daily ed. July 18, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. 
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12 was much more pointed, focusing exclusively on the circuit courts, and 
it signaled a new push from Republicans on judicial nominations.  Senator 
Hatch‟s emphasis coincided with the Judiciary Committee‟s hearing on the 
nomination of Judge Thomas Pickering to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  Hatch argued that there were currently 
thirty-one vacancies on the Courts of Appeals (“far higher than the 
Republicans ever let it reach”), while there had never been more than 
twenty-one at the end of any year in President Clinton‟s first term.  He also 
pointed out that circuit court vacancies totaled only eighteen, fourteen, and 
twenty-five at the end of the 104
th
, 105
th
, and 106
th
 Congresses, 
respectively.
188
  And he argued that eight of sixteen positions on the Sixth 
Circuit, and four of twelve on the D.C. Circuit, sat vacant despite pending 
nominations. 
Hatch‟s points were mostly well-taken.  The thirty-one vacancies in the 
circuit courts were a high number relative to other times, although twenty-
five of the vacancies had been inherited from the Clinton administration.  
However, the story of the Sixth Circuit and D.C. Circuit vacancies was 
perhaps more complex than Hatch represented.  Four of the Sixth Circuit 
vacancies had been unfilled for at least the entire last year of the Clinton 
administration, 2000, and one had been open since May 1, 1995.
189
  
Similarly, two of the D.C. Circuit vacancies had existed since August 1996 
and November 1999.  Moreover, during the Clinton administration, some 
Republicans had objected to filling the two D.C. Circuit vacancies because, 
in their estimation, the court did not need more than ten judges.
190
 
Following the party-line defeat of Thomas Pickering‟s Fifth Circuit 
nomination in the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 14, 2002,
191
 
Senate Republicans determined to highlight what they perceived as 
breakdowns in the judicial nomination process.  Senator Trent Lott, the 
                                                                                                                
S6794 (daily ed. July 15, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S2936-37 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. 
S2201 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2002). 
188 148 CONG. REC. S1739 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002).  
189  See Ghosts Of Nominations Past:  Setting The Record Straight:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Admin. Oversight of the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 18-22 (2002) 
(testimony of Kent Markus, Professor, Capital University Law School). 
190 Amy Goldstein & Neely Tucker, Bush Plans To Add 2 Judges to Key Court; Senate GOP for 
Years Blocked Filling All Seats, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2002. at A01; Saundra Torry & Toni Locy, In 
Rocky Session, Judge of U.S. Appeals Court for D.C. Confirmed, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1997, at A14 
(“Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), a conservative elected to the Senate in November [argued] that it would 
be a „rip-off‟ of taxpayers to allow the court to have more than 10 judges.”). 
191 The Committee voted ten to nine against the nomination and ten to nine against sending the 
nomination to the floor without a recommendation.  Helen Dewar & Amy Goldstein, Appeals Court 
Choice Rejected; Senate Panel Hands Bush 1st Defeat on Judicial Nomination, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 
2002, at A01. 
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Senate Minority Leader and Pickering‟s main supporter, attributed the 
nominee‟s defeat in part to Democrats‟ desire for payback for slow judicial 
confirmations during the Clinton administration.
192
  Lott echoed a 
frequently-made Republican claim about the Clinton years:  “[T]he 
Judiciary Committee under the Republicans didn‟t kill a single nominee 
during the Clinton years in the committee.  We did defeat one of them, but 
we first reported him out of the committee and then defeated him on the 
floor with a recorded vote.”193 
Lott was understandably upset over the defeat of the nomination of a 
close friend, but it is hard to believe he could make this claim with a 
straight face.  The Judiciary Committee during the 104
th
 to 106
th
 
Congresses—the last six years of Clinton‟s presidency—may not have 
killed a Clinton nominee by vote of the committee, but the Committee 
nonetheless frequently defeated nominees by the arguably less 
commendable method of simply not giving the nominee a hearing or 
vote.
194
  According to Professor Sheldon Goldman‟s calculations, during 
the final six years of the Clinton administration, while Senator Hatch 
chaired the Judiciary Committee, twenty-eight of seventy-nine appellate 
nominees received no hearings, along with forty-eight of the 262 district 
court nominees.
195
 
                                                 
192 148 CONG. REC. S1916 (daily ed. Mar., 2002) (statement of Sen. Lott) (“This is a „We will 
show you; you didn‟t always move our nominees‟ payback.”); see also id. at S1923-24 (statement of 
Sen. Kyl) (“There is also a very significant undercurrent of retribution.”). 
193 Id. at S1916.  Hatch has made the same argument many times.  See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S2201 
(daily ed. Mar. 21, 2002) (“[D]uring the 6 years that Republicans controlled the Senate during the 
Clinton administration, not once was one of his judicial nominations killed by a committee vote.”); see 
also 147 CONG. REC. S10763 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2001) (statement of Sen. Sessions).  Senator Lott also 
offered a “Sense of the Senate” resolution which recited many Republican claims regarding judicial 
nominations.  Id. at S1917. 
194 See generally supra notes 47-78 and accompanying text (discussing the veto-gates that can kill 
nominations—committee inaction, holds, and blue slips). 
195 Goldman, Unpicking, supra note 15, at 709, 712.  See also 148 CONG. REC. S1924 (daily ed. 
Mar. 14, 2002) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“Only one judge was defeated on the floor of the Senate, and I 
do not think any were defeated in the committee, as Judge Pickering was today.  But there were some 
judges who did not get a hearing.  Maybe there were too many.”).  Professor Goldman counts people 
nominated for the same judicial vacancy in more than one Congress as separate nominations.  Senator 
Hatch generally counts the same such multiple nominations as single nominations only, so he claims 
that fewer nominees failed to receive hearings.  See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S1920 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 
2002).  The consideration of persons nominated for the same position in successive Congresses is a 
difficult issue, because it also affects the number of days that a nominee is “pending” before the Senate.  
When complaining of delay in the process, both parties generally count from the date of the first 
nomination to the date of the final action—even if in another Congress and thus technically a different 
nomination—in calculating how long the Senate took to consider a particular nominee.   
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2. Fallacy #5 (―Killing Floor‖) 
Failure to acknowledge nominations that never received a hearing or 
vote at the committee level when tallying the number of nominations 
―defeated‖ in a particular Congress. 
 
On March 14, Senator Hatch also offered a comprehensive defense of 
his Committee‟s performance during the final six years of the Clinton 
administration.  He specifically addressed the large number of nominees 
who had received no hearings: 
 
There were only 68 Article III Judicial nominees who were 
nominated by President Clinton, in all of his 8 years, who 
did not get confirmed.  Of those, 3 were left at the end of 
the 103rd Congress, when the Democrats controlled the 
Senate.  That leaves 65.  Of those, 12 were withdrawn by 
the President, leaving 53.  Nine were nominated too late 
for the Congress and committee to act on them or they 
were lacking paperwork.  That leaves 44.  Now, 17 of 
those lacked home state support, which was often the 
result of a lack of consultation with home State Senators.  
There was no way to confirm them without ignoring the 
senatorial courtesy that we afford to home State Senators 
in the nomination process.  That left 27.  One nominee was 
defeated on the floor, which leaves only 26 remaining 
nominees.
196
 
 
Hatch‟s numbers here are in large measure correct,197 and his narration 
provides nuanced insight into how the Judiciary Committee considers 
judicial nominations and demonstrates how difficult it is to compare 
nomination statistics from different time periods.  As discussed above, a 
nomination can fail for any number of reasons, not all of which are the 
“fault” of the Judiciary Committee or its chairman.  Hatch does not spell 
                                                 
196 148 CONG. REC. S1919 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002).  And this coming from the same Senator with 
an avowed antipathy for “statistical judo!”  See supra note 1 (citing “statistical judo”).    
197 The Senate library nominations database shows sixty-nine Clinton judicial nominations not 
acted upon, five of which were from the 103rd Congress, 1993 to 1994.  Eighteen of the sixty-nine 
failed nominees were nominated in at least two sessions of Congress, so Democratic lawmakers 
sometimes claim a greater number of failed nominations.  Twenty-two of the sixty-nine were circuit 
court nominees, and nine of those were nominated in multiple Congresses.  Because blue slips and 
holds were private during the Hatch years, Hatch‟s claims cannot be evaluated in their entirety. 
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out when a nomination would be made “too late” to be considered, but 
looking back over previous election years we see successful nominations in 
presidential election years as late as September 28, 1984; August 3, 1988; 
September 17, 1992; June 6, 1996; July 21, 2000; and July 22, 2004.   
Hatch also returned to arguments he had made previously
198
 comparing 
the Clinton confirmation record with that of the Bush I administration:  “So 
the argument that this all began because the Republicans were unfair to 
Clinton nominees is simply untrue.  We were not.  I was more fair to 
Clinton in confirming nominees than the Democrats were to President 
George H.W. Bush.”199  While many Democrats would take exception with 
any argument that Hatch was fair to Clinton nominees, his point about 
Democrats stalling with Bush I‟s nominees is important.  As Professor 
Goldman has shown, significant obstruction and delay in the judicial 
confirmation process actually first appeared during 1988 and 1992, both 
presidential election years when Republicans controlled the White House 
and Democrats controlled the Senate.  As Goldman explains, “But with the 
situation reversed with a Democrat in the White House and the 
Republicans in control of the Senate, the evidence clearly shows that the 
Republicans ratcheted up obstruction and delay, with all-time records [of 
nomination delays] for the district and appeals courts . . . .”200 
Hatch concluded with versions of the Dog Days and Time Out 
fallacies.
201
  Arguing specifically about the circuit courts, he claimed: 
 
Taking numbers by the end of each Congress, a 
Republican-controlled Senate has never-never-left as many 
circuit court vacancies as currently exist today.  At the end 
of the 104th Congress, the number was 18.  At the end of 
the 105th Congress, that number was 14, and even at the 
end of the 106th Congress, a Presidential election year, 
that number was only 25.  Today there are 31 vacancies in 
the circuit courts.
202
 
 
If Hatch had waited until the end of 2002, a more appropriate date for 
comparison, he would have found that the number of circuit court 
vacancies had declined to twenty-five.  But, importantly, twelve of those 
                                                 
198 See supra notes 162-70 (discussing January 25, 2002). 
199 148 CONG. REC. S1920 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002).  
200 Goldman, Assessing, supra note 15 at 256-57. 
201 148 CONG. REC. S1920 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002). 
202 Id. 
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spots had been vacant for at least one year under Clinton and were thus 
particularly difficult for some Democrats to accept being filled with 
Republican nominees.  As Senator Leahy argued, “This is a case of the 
arsonist coming forward and saying:  We need a better fire department 
around here.  Look at all these buildings that are burning down.  All these 
vacancies were there because Republicans refused to hold hearings on the 
Court of Appeals nominees.”203  In comparison, at the end of 1994, with 
Democrats in both the White House and Senate, there were fifteen 
appellate vacancies, only five of which were held over from Bush I.   
Senator Mitch McConnell, a Republican from Kentucky, took a new 
tack in late March 2002, arguing that nominees for the Sixth Circuit had 
been pending for too long without votes.  He pointed to one judge pending 
for ninety-three days; three for 134 days; another for 164 days; and two 
more for “an incredible 317 days” each.204  While 317 days, or even 
ninety-three, might seem like a long time to those uninitiated in the 
vagaries of the judicial confirmation process, McConnell‟s comment only 
invited Democratic reminders of the much longer wait times that many 
Clinton nominees faced before ultimate action—confirmation, rejection, or 
return to the President—under the Republican-led Senate.  Indeed, Senator 
Leahy had the numbers at hand: “I think of Helene White [a 1997 Clinton 
nominee to the Sixth Circuit].  She waited 1,454 days.  I do not recall a 
single Member of the Republican Party saying should she not at least have 
a hearing; even if we vote her down, should she not at least have a hearing.  
She did not even have a hearing or a vote in the committee; 1,454 days, not 
a word.”205 
                                                 
203 148 CONG. REC. S2759 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see also 148 CONG. 
REC. S2206 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2002) (statement of Sen. Schumer): 
 
Well, a problem cannot be created and then the complaint made that someone 
else is not solving it fast enough.  That is the height of unfairness.  That is the 
height of sophistry . . . .  Do not make the argument about vacancies that you 
have created unless you are prepared to make this a partnership to fill those 
vacancies. 
 
See also id. at S3549 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2002) (statement of Sen. Reid) (comparing Republicans to 
the perpetrator of matricide and patricide who asks his sentencing judge for leniency on account of his 
status as an orphan). 
204 148 CONG. REC. S2205 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2002) (“Jeffrey Sutton and Deborah Cook were 
nominated an incredible 317 days ago with no hearings on any of these nominees.”).  Sutton and Cook 
were two of Bush II‟s first nominations, made on May 9, 2001.  Those nominations were returned to 
the President under the provisions of Senate Rule XXXI, paragraph 6, supra note 50, on August 3, 
2001, due to the Senate‟s summer recess.  Bush then renominated the candidates on September 4, 2001, 
and the nominations were held over rather than returned during the winter break of 2001-2002. 
205 148 CONG. REC. S2215 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2002).  He continued: 
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Perhaps chastened,
206
 McConnell came back the next month with a new 
argument, albeit one afflicted by the Dog Days and Time Out fallacies.  
His argument was simple:  “[A]t least eighty-six percent of circuit court 
nominees from the administration of President Jimmy Carter through 
President Bill Clinton got a full Senate vote,”207 but only seven of twenty-
nine Bush II circuit court nominees had received votes thus far in the 107
th
 
Congress.  The problem, of course, was that the Congress still had more 
than eight months to run.  Reagan got nineteen appellate judges confirmed 
in his first Congress, but ten of them were confirmed from March to 
December of his second year in office.  Bush I had twenty-two appellate 
judges confirmed in his first Congress, but seventeen were confirmed 
between March and December of his second year in office.  For Clinton, 
sixteen of the nineteen appellate judges confirmed during his first Congress 
were confirmed from March to December of his second year in office.  Ten 
more Bush II appellate nominees, of the thirty-one he nominated during his 
first Congress, were ultimately confirmed in 2002.  Though still not as 
many or as high a percentage of appellate judges were confirmed for Bush 
II as for his predecessors, the circuit-court confirmation numbers from 
Bush II‟s first Congress ended up substantially greater than those 
suggested by McConnell‟s premature argument. 
Senator Leahy‟s comments on April 25, 2001, show his continued focus 
on aggressively raising what this article characterizes as the Dog Days and 
Time Out fallacies:   
                                                                                                                
I look at the other qualified nominees we had to wait for.  There was another one, 
Fifth Circuit.  H. Alston Johnson waited 602 days, no hearing.  There was James 
Duffy, Ninth Circuit, 546 days, no hearing.  And Kathleen McCree Lewis, 
extraordinarily competent attorney, daughter of one of the most respected 
solicitors general ever in this country, she waited 455 days and never received a 
hearing.  There was Kent Markus of the Sixth Circuit who waited 309 days under 
the Republicans and never got a hearing.  And Robert Cindrich of the Third 
Circuit who never received a hearing in over 300 days.  
Then there were the nominations that were held up without a hearing such as 
Judge James Beaty who waited 1,033 days, no hearing.  James Wynn, Fourth 
Circuit, 497 days, no hearing.  Enrique Moreno, Fifth Circuit, waited 455 days, 
never got a hearing.  Jorge Rangel, the Fifth Circuit, 454 days, never received a 
hearing.  
Allen Snyder, the D.C. Circuit; now I will give them credit, he waited 449 days 
and finally did get a hearing.  Of course, they never brought it to a vote in the 
committee, but he did receive a hearing.  He and Bonnie Campbell, the former 
Iowa Attorney General had hearings but never were on the Committee agenda 
for a vote. 
 
206 Though not too much; McConnell made essentially the same argument about delay on April 16, 
2002.  148 CONG. REC. S2692 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 2002). 
207 148 CONG. REC. S2601 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2002). 
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With today‟s votes, the total number of Federal judges 
confirmed since the change in Senate majority will now be 
50.  As our action today demonstrates, again, we are 
moving to confirm President Bush‟s nominees at a faster 
pace than the nominees of prior presidents.  It took almost 
14 months for the Senate to confirm 50 judicial nominees 
for the Reagan administration.  It took more than 15 
months for the Senate to confirm 50 judicial nominees for 
the Clinton administration.  And it took nearly 18 months 
for the Senate to confirm 50 judicial nominees for the 
George H.W. Bush administration.
208
 
 
Because of the Senate changeover in mid-2001, Leahy simply did not 
count the first seven months of that year.  But, as shown above, very few 
judges, if any, would have been confirmed in the early months of the Bush 
II presidency regardless of party control in the Senate.  If the full fifteen 
months of the 107
th
 Congress are counted, one sees from Leahy‟s own 
numbers that in April 2002 the Senate was on an average pace for 
confirmation of Bush II‟s first fifty judges.209 
As May 9, 2002, the first anniversary of Bush II‟s first eleven circuit 
court judge nominations, approached, the Republicans began to more 
aggressively make judicial confirmations an issue.  At the end of April, 
Senator Hatch laid out the new battle plan:   
 
The most important measure of performance should be 
how we are handling the most important courts:  the 
Circuit Court of Appeals.  Let‟s compare the treatment of 
President Bush‟s first 11 circuit court nominees to the first 
11 of previous presidents . . . .  [After nearly 365 days] 
                                                 
208 148 CONG. REC. S3418 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 2002). 
209 Leahy repeated this fallacy throughout the remainder of the 107th Congress.  See 148 CONG. 
REC. S11522 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S11306-S11308 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2002); 
148 CONG. REC. S11206 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S11047 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002); 
148 CONG. REC. S10344-S10347 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S9975-S9977 (daily ed. 
Oct. 4, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S9896-S9897 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S8958 (daily 
ed. Sept. 20, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S8664 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S8588 (daily 
ed. Sept. 13, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S8511 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S8448 (daily 
ed. Sept. 10, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S7808, S7813 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S7452-
S7457 (daily ed. July 29, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S7397 (daily ed. July 26, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. 
S7017-S7019 (daily ed. July 18, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S6795 (daily ed. July 15, 2002) (explaining 
that the two-month delay since the most recent confirmation was due to disagreement between 
administration and Senate leadership over appointments to bipartisan boards and commissions); 148 
CONG. REC. S3522 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2002). 
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only 3 of the President‟s first 11 nominees are confirmed.  
Is this what the Democratic leadership considers a record-
breaking pace?  It may be record-breaking, all right, but 
not the record they‟re talking about.  They are confirming 
with the velocity of molasses.
210
 
 
Hatch unfavorably compared this 2001 record to that of the first eleven 
circuit court nominees for Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton, all of whom had 
been confirmed within a year of nomination.
211
  This was true, though as 
explained above the first eleven circuit court nominations of these earlier 
presidents were made over an extended period of time, extending into the 
second years of their administrations, rather than in one block at the very 
beginning of “confirmation season.”212 
Senator Reid countered Senator Hatch by noting that five of the eleven 
vacancies which Bush II sought to fill were for positions that had been 
unfilled for at least a year or more during the Clinton administration.
213
  
This was true, and Reid perhaps even undersold his point.  In fact, eight of 
the eleven Bush II nominations were to positions that had been vacant 
since 1999 or earlier, with one stretching all the way back to 1990, during 
the Bush I administration.  But Reid did not tell the full story: many of the 
vacancies filled by Clinton‟s first eleven appointments had also been held 
unfilled for over a year at the end of the Bush I administration.  This is a 
function of the Four Corners relevancy, which is embraced by each party 
during different time periods depending on who controls the political 
branches. 
Finally, on May 9, 2002, the Republicans fully opened their offensive 
on judicial nominations.  Speaking for the Republicans on the Senate floor 
were Senators Hatch, Thompson, Voinovich, Grassley, Frist, Hutchinson, 
Hutchison, DeWine, Allard, Lott, McConnell, Brownback, Nickles, 
Santorum, and Kyl.
214
  Senator Hatch set out the main arguments for the 
Republicans.  He dragged out his familiar Absolute Value fallacy and 
repeated his arguments about the number of nominees pending without a 
                                                 
210 148 CONG. REC. S3528-29 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2002).  See also id. at S3545 (statement of Sen. 
Kyl). 
211 Id. at S3528.   
212 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
213 148 CONG. REC. S3549 (daily ed. May 9, 2002). 
214 See id. at S4089-S4132 (daily ed. May 9, 2002).  Senators Leahy, Reid, Durbin, and Feingold 
answered on behalf of the Democrats, using arguments substantially similar to those made and 
discussed before. 
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vote at the end of the Bush I and Clinton presidencies.
215
  He again 
compared confirmation results for the first eleven circuit court nominees 
under the past four administrations.
216
  Finally, Hatch introduced a new 
argument comparing the success of the first hundred judicial nominees 
under the past few administrations:  Clinton, ninety-seven of one hundred 
confirmed in an average of ninety-three days; Bush I, ninety-five of one 
hundred confirmed in an average of seventy-eight days; Reagan, ninety-
seven of one hundred in an average of thirty-six days.  Bush II, only fifty-
two of one hundred confirmed in an average of 150 days so far.
217
 
Senator Leahy in July 2002 showed the other way to interpret these 
numbers, essentially by invoking a variation of the Future Shock 
relevancy: while the Reagan and Bush I judges were confirmed at a high 
rate and relatively quickly following their nominations, the hundredth 
judge for each president was not nominated or confirmed until well within 
their third year in office.
218
  In other words, Bush II had nominated many 
more judges far more quickly than his Republican predecessors.  However, 
Leahy did not mention that Clinton had gotten his first hundred judges 
considered by late September of his second year in office, in 1994. 
As the 107
th
 Congress drew to a close, Republicans were finally in a 
position to make comparisons based on the success of judicial nominees 
over the entire two-year period.  The focus was again on appellate court 
nominees.  On October 3, 2002, Senator McConnell laid out the relevant 
statistics: 
 
[In 1981-1982] President Reagan submitted 20 
nominations for the circuit court, and 19 of them were 
confirmed—95 percent.  President Reagan, of course, had 
a Republican Senate during those 2 years.  President 
George Bush in his first 2 years, when his party did not 
control the Senate . . . submitted 23 circuit court 
nominations, and 22 of them were confirmed—96-percent 
. . . .  With regard to President Clinton in his first 2 years, a 
period during which his party did control the Senate, he 
submitted 22 circuit court nominations, and 19 were 
confirmed.  That is an 86-percent confirmation rate . . . .  
Then we look at the first 2 years of the presidency of 
                                                 
215 See discussion supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
216 See discussion supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text. 
217 148 CONG. REC. S4094 (daily ed. May 9, 2002). 
218 Id. at S6704 (daily ed. July 12, 2002). 
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George W. Bush, which is now coming to a conclusion.  
We are near the end now where the statistics actually mean 
something.  President George W. Bush has submitted 32 
circuit court nominations to the Senate, and only 14 have 
been confirmed, which is 44 percent.  Forty-four percent.  
This is the worst record in anybody‟s memory of 
confirming circuit court nominations of a President in his 
first 2 years.
219
 
 
Ultimately, only seventeen of the Bush II circuit court nominations 
during the 107
th
 Congress were confirmed within that two-year period.  
Fifteen other nominations were returned to the president at the end of the 
session.  The district court statistics were much better, with eighty-three of 
ninety-eight nominees (84.7%) confirmed, but this percentage was still not 
as good as other presidents had done in their first two years, though 
Reagan and Clinton had benefited from Senates controlled by their own 
parties.
220
  During the Clinton years that Republicans controlled the Senate, 
district court nominees fared worse than they did under Bush II, but for 
perhaps the most comparable period,
221
 the 105
th
 Congress (1997-98), the 
numbers were essentially the same, with seventy-nine of ninety-four 
nominees (84.0%) confirmed.
222
 
 
IV. RESOLVING THE “PROBLEM?” 
 
Though this article has focused on categorizing and evaluating Senate 
rhetoric on judicial confirmation statistics in the 107
th
 Congress, I will also 
offer a few normative thoughts on some of the Senate‟s institutional 
practices that contribute to delay in the nomination and confirmation 
process.  First, the Constitution arguably neither requires nor prohibits 
much in the way of formal or informal Senate procedure with respect to the 
                                                 
219 148 CONG. REC. S9863-64 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2002). 
220 Goldman, Assessing, supra note 15, at 253.  Statistics for the approval rates of presidents‟ 
district court nominees during their first Congress are as follows:  Reagan, sixty-eight of sixty-nine 
(98.6%); Bush I, forty-eight of fifty (96%); Clinton, 107 of 118 (90.7%).  Id.   
221 The period was comparable because it followed a presidential election year.  Thus many 
nominations had been held up for months prior to resumption of activity by the Judiciary Committee.  
On the other hand, the comparison is not entirely apposite because the Judiciary Committee in 1997 
would have had completed files for many of the re-nominated Clinton judicial candidates. 
222 Goldman, Assessing, supra note 15, at 253.  For the 104th Congress, the record of district court 
nominees was sixty-two of eighty-five (72.9%), and for the 106th (leading up to the 2000 election), the 
record of district court nominees was fifty-seven of eighty-three (68.7%).  Id. 
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judicial confirmation process.
223
  Instead, the contours of the process are 
deliberately left for the political branches to determine.   
Even so, the Senate could make procedural changes that would make 
the judicial confirmation process more democratically legitimate.  In 
particular, individual actions that prevent collective action on nominations 
should be much more limited than in current practice.  Specific examples 
of individual tactics subject to misuse include:  the blue-slip, especially 
when it is anonymous, and when it is treated by the Judiciary Committee 
chairman as an absolute bar on Committee consideration of a nominee; the 
hold, when implemented for other than the traditional reason of delaying 
Senate action for a brief period in order to give a Senator a chance to study 
an issue or to ensure a senator‟s presence during a vote;224 or any other 
extended delays unilaterally imposed by the Judiciary Committee chairman 
or Majority Leader.  On the other hand, a filibuster of a judicial nominee 
by the minority party in the Senate might be appropriate in narrow cases.
225
   
A regime that disallows individual disruptions of the judicial 
appointments process, while preserving the right to filibuster, would force 
the president to appoint more broadly-acceptable judges.  When the 
opposition party controls the Senate, all but the most controversial 
nominees would get quick votes because the institutional individual delay 
mechanisms that favor the majority would be prohibited.  If the Senate 
majority leadership cannot marshal votes within its own caucus to defeat 
the nominees of an opposition president, the leadership should not be 
allowed to reach that result through non-public procedures.  When the 
president‟s party controls the Senate, all but the most mainstream 
nominees should get quick votes, subject only to filibuster of the most 
controversial nominees.  Such a filibuster would require a public and 
                                                 
223 A great deal of interesting scholarship has been produced on this issue—far too much to cover 
here.  See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 
79 YALE L.J. 657 (1970).  For present purposes, it is enough that “advice and consent” is not defined in 
the Constitution, and that actions by the first Senate showed an original understanding that included 
Senate rejection of a federal executive appointee on parochial grounds.  See supra note 31.   If 
anything, Senate power with respect to lifetime-tenured judges should arguably be greater.  See also 
U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . .”). 
224 For example, separate actions by Senators Byrd and Inhofe holding all judicial appointments to 
protest particular recess appointments, and actions by Michigan senators to hold all of Bush II‟s Sixth 
Circuit nominees.  Cf. 148 CONG. REC. S278 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“I am 
encouraged that this confirmation today was not delayed by extended, unexplained, anonymous holds 
on the Senate Executive Calendar, the type of hold that characterized so much of the previous 6-1⁄2 
years.”). 
225 Defining precisely what cases are appropriate for filibuster is impossible in the abstract, and is 
appropriately left to the political process.  As writers have observed in other contexts, sunlight is the 
best disinfectant.  Forcing a public filibuster allows public pressure to be applied in a way that it cannot 
be when individual holds are allowed. 
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concerted effort by forty or more senators, not an individually-instigated 
backroom deal.   
There is obviously a great deal of play in defining what is “mainstream” 
or which judicial nominees are “controversial,” but such issues will be 
appropriately worked out in the very public political process of debating 
and voting on nominees.  By restricting individual contumaciousness, the 
confirmation process would be much more transparent, and it would be 
easier to make a valid campaign issue out of either party‟s failure to 
confirm judges.  Moreover, senatorial debate could focus on the merits of 
individual judges and might be less susceptible to the fallacies pointed out 
in this article.  When individual senators are not able to subvert the 
confirmation process in private, moderate nominees who enjoy the support 
of a Senate majority—even when the nomination has been made by an 
opposition president—will not be easily blocked. 
The problem with this and other proposals for reform is that they 
require implementation by the majority party at the very time that it has 
gained control of the Senate‟s advice-and-consent apparatus.  A 
determined Judiciary Committee chairman could effect blue-slip reform, 
through an extension of the agreement that Hatch and Leahy memorialized 
in the Congressional Record in June 2001, but modification of the hold 
procedure would require the actions of the Majority Leader.  Formalizing 
any agreement through Senate Rule or statute could make the agreement 
binding on future Senates. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The 107
th
 Congress, covering the years 2001 and 2002, was a 
particularly interesting period with respect to the increasingly contentious 
battleground of lower-court judicial nominations.  In arguing about the 
progress—or lack thereof—of judicial confirmations, during this time 
senators on both sides of the political aisle frequently made statistics-laden 
comparisons to the Senate‟s confirmations performance in previous 
Congresses.  This article has shown that the majority of these numerical 
comparisons, made by both Democrats and Republicans, suffered from an 
identifiable set of fallacies.  Awareness of these fallacies by participants in 
the confirmations process, in addition to critics, scholars, the media and the 
public at large, may serve to steer future argument away from irrelevant 
numerical comparisons and toward more legitimate and merit-based 
consideration of judicial nominees.  
